

JPRS-EPS-84-060

9 May 1984

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

9 May 1984

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Deputy Foreign Minister Interviewed on Syria, Angola
(Stanislav Svoboda Interview; AL-BA'TH, 16 Feb 84)..... 1

HUNGARY

- Council of Ministers Journal Scores Impotence of Parliament
(Pal Dunay; ALLAM ES IGAZGATAS, 19 Jan 84)..... 6
- Introducing Specialized Work Groups in Schools Probed
(Sandor Suhai; KOZNEVELES, 23 Mar 84)..... 18
- Fate of Social Welfare Policies Weighed
(Zsuzsa Ferge; MAGYAR HIRLAP, 11 Apr 84)..... 21

POLAND

- Kubiak Comments on Cultural Affairs Commission Activities
(RZECZPOSPOLITA, No 60, 10-11 Mar 84)..... 24
- PZPR Conference Delegates Discuss Proceedings
(TRYBUNA LUDU, No 70, 22 Mar 84)..... 26
- PZPR Struggles, Alliances Defended
(Stanislaw Wronski; NOWE DROGI, No 1, Jan 84)..... 29
- New Electoral Law Passed
(ODRODZENIE, No 9, 28 Feb 84)..... 42
- Preconditions for Law and Order Examined
(Witold Olszewski; LAD, No 9, 4 Mar 84)..... 73

Credibility in Television Programming Studied (Albin Kania Interview; PRASA POLSKA, No 2, Feb 84).....	75
Briefs	
New Personal Computer	82
Support for Textile Industry	82
Power Station Project Resumed	82
Union Complaints About Economy	83
Kubiak at Exhibit Opening	83
Kubiak at Krakow Party Meeting	83
ROMANIA	
Briefs	
Governmental Personnel Changes	84
YUGOSLAVIA	
Salaries of Top Government, Party Posts (OSLOBODJENJE, 27 Mar 84).....	85
Bosnian Paper Criticizes Slovene Student Journal's Satire (Zoran Odic; OSLOBODJENJE, 30 Mar 84).....	88
Youth Paper's Editorialist Mocks Serbian Chauvinism (Dragan Bisenic; OMLADINSKE, 11 Mar 84).....	90

DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON SYRIA, ANGOLA

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 16 Feb 84 p 8

[Interview with Stanislav Svoboda, deputy foreign minister, by AL-BA'TH correspondent Ilyas Tuma in Prague; date not given]

[Text] Prague--Ilyas Tuma--AL-BA'TH correspondent--The current events in the Middle East region, with its various conflicts and interactions, take on an unusual importance on the international level because of their intensity and heat on the one hand and their relationships and repercussions on the other.

Our region, in the final analysis, is a wide front in which the patriotic and progressive forces fight their joint battles to restrain the forces of imperialism, Zionism and aggression, which are attempting to consolidate their control and impose their hegemony over the region. It is natural in this fierce battle that the positions and struggles of the patriotic forces in the region, whose vanguard is represented by Syria, should interact with the positions of their friends among the ranks of the progressive and socialist forces in the world. It is also natural that the positions of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party [ASBP] and its secretary general, Struggler Comrade Hafiz al-Asad, be esteemed and supported by the various struggling forces, particularly in the arena of the socialist camp.

AL-BA'TH, in an attempt to reflect the events and interactions occurring in our region on the Czechoslovakian level, has met with Comrade Stanislav Svoboda, Czechoslovakian deputy foreign minister, in Prague for this interview:

[Tuma] As we enter the new year, it appears that the international political situation is at the height of unrest and danger. How do you view the dangerous events which the world has been and is witnessing, particularly in the old continent of Europe?

[Svoboda] The year 1983 was a decisive one in the field of international politics, especially as regards the attempts that were made in Europe to avoid the serious danger which appeared with the decision to deploy the new American missiles. The situation deteriorated to a great extent at the end of the year and especially when the United States deployed its new nuclear missiles on the soil of the NATO countries, thereby striking a blow at the talks which were going on in Geneva and threatening the security of Europe as well as others.

The United States and its allies in NATO bear total responsibility for the changes in the situation. This is indicated by the fact that the U.S. did not want to reach a treaty of equality but instead, at any cost, continued to deploy the new nuclear missiles on the borders of the socialist camp.

The Soviet Union has announced during the last 4 years, since the "NATO two-track decision" was made, that if this was carried out it could only have an adverse reaction and that, if the U.S. and its allies did not change their decisions on this matter, they would definitely sense a difference between the situation before the missile deployment and after it. The U.S. missile deployment in Western Europe created a totally new situation which directly threatens Czechoslovakia. For this reason, the Soviet Union and its allies have been forced to take appropriate positions and actions to respond to this situation and to strengthen the security of the socialist camp while at the same time maintaining the balance of military forces in Europe and serving European security as a whole and the interests of world peace.

In spite of all the existing complicated problems, we believe that it is possible to leave this dangerous period in the development of the international situation behind if the U.S. and the NATO allies evince the desire to return to the status quo before the new American intermediate-range missile deployment and that the Soviet Union would take the same step.

[Tuma] The United States, in cooperation with its Atlantic allies and its advance base Israel, is attempting to achieve a permanent, comprehensive hegemony over the Middle Eastern region by way of the Lebanese gate. In your opinion, what are the necessary fundamental steps to prevent such a hegemony and what responsibilities do the forces of freedom and progress have to prevent this new colonialist expansion from occurring?

[Swoboda] Recently we have been eyewitnesses to the violent attempts of imperialism to stop the process of change in the general balance of power, which is due to the fact that the basic factor in these forces changing the current balance to the detriment of imperialist interests is represented by the patriotic liberation movements in which the Arab patriotic and progressive forces play an important role.

For this reason, it is not at all surprising that the Arab regimes and forces which express the joint aspirations of the Arabs are a target for imperialism in the Middle East region because it considers them to be a hindrance to the achievement of their goals of hegemony. The recent strategic agreement between America and Israel and America's entry into Lebanon are nothing other than outstanding indications of hostility toward the peoples of the Middle Eastern region.

The situation which came as a result of the imperialist Zionist alliances makes it incumbent upon the Arab patriotic forces to call for continual and decisive struggle to protect the freedom and independent development of the Arab nations. The experience of history indicates that the threat of imperialism cannot be stopped and eliminated by means of surrender or pleading but only by decisive struggle. We are confident that the one thing which can restore and protect

the legitimate rights of the Arabs and of the Palestinian people is decisive action by all the united Arab patriotic forces on the basis of joint struggle against the hostile plots of imperialism and Zionism.

In my opinion, in order to achieve the final result of this struggle, there is one decisively important fact, which is that the Arabs are not alone in their struggle. All those who love freedom in the world are with them, in addition to the support of the socialist countries, in whose forefront is the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia has expressed its fundamental solidarity with the struggle of the Arab people more than once and in a prominent manner through effective aid. The importance of this support, which is participating in strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Arab nations and the bolstering of their economic development, is well known. I want to say something important here: that the struggle of the countries of the socialist camp for peace and to further restrain the ambitions of the hostile imperialist forces in the world is at the same time a struggle on behalf of the rights and security of the peoples of the Middle East region. There is no doubt that the new American missile deployment in Western Europe gives a free hand to the U.S. to intervene also against the nations of the Middle East and Near East.

American imperialism in concert with Zionism recently chose Lebanon as a target for its attacks in order to separate it from its commitments and to make it a land which is hostile to the Arabs.

It is necessary to force the Israeli occupiers and the interventionist of the so-called Multinational Force to unconditionally pull out of this nation and to not permit them to realize the Lebanese-Israeli treaty. This of course demands firm cooperation among all the Palestinian, Lebanese and Arab sides.

We consider that the ability of the patriotic forces to confront the plots of the United States and Israel is directly related to the degree of their unity. The cooperation of the Palestinian revolution's forces with the Arab patriot forces has a strategic and direct importance in this field.

The struggle to achieve the legitimate demands of the Palestinian people remains the basic problem in the struggle against imperialist and Zionist goals. We believe that realizing the proposition calling for an international conference on the Middle East question is certainly one of the effective forms of struggle with the cooperation of all the concerned sides, among the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people.

[Tuma] In the bourgeois Western nations there is a widespread, fervent campaign against Syria and its principled positions. The story goes in well-informed circles there that Syria is an "obstacle" to peace solutions in the Middle Eastern region. How do you view this and how do you assess a Syrian role in the continuing struggle in the Middle East?

[Swoboda] Yes, Syria is a true obstacle in the so-called American peace attempts. We in Czechoslovakia view Syria as a true obstacle to the achievement of U.S. hegemonist goals in the Middle East and a containing factor for the Zionist expansionist policy of Israel. Naturally, Syria is becoming a target for imperialist attacks because of its decisive rejectionist stand to counterbalance the

American solution to the Middle East problem and because of its principled anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist policy.

The attacks and provocations which are being perpetrated against Syria have one goal, to weaken Syria and to force it to change its progressive foreign policy and stop cooperating with the socialist nations.

We highly value the continuing efforts by the Syrian command aimed at achieving a just and comprehensive solution to the Middle East crisis. We expressed our support for Syria's struggle not long ago in a Foreign Ministry communique on developments in the Middle East situation.

The Czechoslovakian people have been and will remain in solidarity with the efforts of the friendly Syrian Arab people to defend independence and national sovereignty.

[Tuma] There is an old, firm friendship between Syria and Czechoslovakia. How do you assess the current level of relations and where do you see possibilities to expand and deepen them?

[Swoboda] Our valuable joint cooperation has developed over many years and today includes the party and political fields, the commercial economy, tactics, culture, etc. In our opinion it serves as an example of equal friendly relations having mutual benefits. Here I want to mention that the peak and the most important part of our joint cooperation was the visit by the secretary general of the ASBP, President Hafiz al-Asad, to Czechoslovakia in 1975 and the visit of the secretary general of the CPCZ, President of the Republic Gustav Husak, to Syria in 1979. We consider cooperation between the CPCZ and the ASBP to be an important asset in the political dialogue and in the long-term relations between the parliaments of the two countries. We highly value the cooperation and firm relations existing on the level of social organizations, and especially of laborers, women, professionals and youth.

We consider Syria also to be one of the most important trading partners among the lesser developed countries. We have an ongoing desire to participate according to our means in building up and industrializing the Syrian economy in accordance with Syria's development plans and especially in setting up public investments and special tactical principles. We assess the moderate growth in Syrian exports to Czechoslovakia to be a positive factor in joint economic cooperation. From all of the above, we may conclude that our ties with Syria are a wide-ranging variety of relations in all fields and on different levels. For this reason, we consider that the main task in the future will be to deepen and widen these relations and security obligations through the existing treaties and agreements and to attempt to establish new relations between the various organizations and centers in both countries, which will serve to promote a mutual exchange of information and expertise. This will also aid in improving life in our two friendly countries.

[Tuma] For several months, a number of Czechoslovakian citizens have been held hostage in Angola by the reactionary UNITA organization, which opposes the Angolan Government regime. Can you give us a glimpse of the background for this incident? Where are efforts being made to free the remaining members of your colony in Angola?

[Swoboda] On 12 March 1983, during an attack by the organization opposing the Angolan Government, the so-called UNITA, on the industrial complex of Alto Catumbela, 66 Czechoslovakian citizens, among them 28 men, 17 women and 21 children between the ages of 12 and 15 were taken hostage. These citizens are experts and specialists who were taking part in realizing the production quotas for the paper and energy industries. Among them are nurses and members of their families. They were forced to walk about 2,000 km in harsh climatic conditions and on the way Czechoslovakian citizen Jaroslav Navatil died as a result of physical exhaustion. As a result of efforts by the president and government of Czechoslovakia, echoed in a positive way by various leaders of friendly states and international organizations, and as a result of efforts by the ICRC, 45 of our citizens, all of them women and children except for seven men, were set free unconditionally, leaving 20 citizens still in the hands of UNITA. The basic demand by UNITA in return for setting them free is the release of members of the organization who were legally arrested as a result of their terrorist activities against innocent citizens. The goal with UNITA is pursuing is clear--the utilization of propaganda to make it appear to be a true political force in Angola and to force some sides to become interested in a dialogue with them so that this will be considered a certain form of recognition. In the final analysis, it aims at disturbing the brotherly relations between Czechoslovakia and Angola.

We are now exerting great diplomatic efforts aimed at releasing the other hostages. I delivered letters from the president of the Republic of Czechoslovakia to a number of national leaders and governments at the end of last year asking that they participate in achieving this release. They expressed their understanding of this request and pledged to exert their own efforts.

At the end of last year UNITA released 26 foreign persons who were, like our citizens, participating in the renovation and construction of the Angolan national economy. This is a new testimonial to UNITA's desire to utilize our citizens for political purposes.

The present situation of our citizens irritates various circles among our people. According to information from the ICRC and representatives of the Western press who were able to visit them, the health and psychological situation among them is very poor. Their living conditions are extremely difficult. They have no news from the outside world and no news of the efforts being made to release them. They are isolated from each other, which affects their spirits adversely. For this reason the call for their rapid return to their homeland is a very urgent matter.

CSO: 4400/434

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS JOURNAL SCORES IMPOTENCE OF PARLIAMENT

Budapest ALLAM ES IGAZGATAS in Hungarian 19 Jan 84 pp 1-10

/Article by Pal Dunay: "The Government and the Parliament in European Socialist States"

/Text/ In examining the relation of parliament and government we must make some introductory observations concerning the environment of these two state organs, and primarily concerning the place occupied by them in the political system. The most important element of this, however, is the connection linking them to parties. We must mention that at the time of the development of the conception of a division of power in the 18th century, then at the time of its more or less successful translation into practice, state power was still the center of power. Everything changed fundamentally in the second half of the 19th century, with the appearance of parties in the modern sense and with the rapid growth of their role, since in developed states state power became only one, although by no means secondary, act with political power. Thus the system of conditions within whose framework parliament and government exercise their functions was more and more complicated. And this was inherited in the 20th century--with the peculiarities arising from the weaknesses of the East European development of bourgeois democracy--by the socialist states that came into being predominantly around the middle of the century.

The traditional European model of bourgeois state development on the other hand is fairly unambiguous: several parties contend for the votes of the citizens, and on the basis of elections the individual parties get a determined number of seats in parliament. If one party receives a majority, the government is formed from its leading members. If there is no such party, several parties, making numerous compromises, distribute the posts in the government among themselves and prepare a joint government program. During the sessions the parliamentary deputies of the parties generally vote in accordance with prior party decisions.

In the socialist states new elements add to the picture, for as a result of the centralization of the party system, parallel lines of decision come into existence, by which we mean that high-level state decisions are in every case preceded by a stand of the corresponding party organ on the basis of the principle of party guidance, and thus the elected representative organ, too, occasionally just searches for rather than finds its functions. There has never yet been, however, such intensive intervention in the relationships of society as among the relationships of socialism (this change is discernible primarily in the economy).

I. The Plenary Session of Parliament and the Government

With the development of the bourgeois state, the relation of parliament and government reached that state of fundamental tension where the action of government, signifying the peak of the state bureaucracy, became in practice impossible to supervise and for the most part baffling. There, too, the increased burden of state intervention weighs most heavily on the civil service. The illusion of controllability by parliament also vanishes, because the government is much more closely scrutinized by its party (parties) and, on the occasion of elections, by voters who are, however, strongly manipulated, than by the highest representative body.

The reality of parliaments is a fairly far cry from that of a working body that appeared as the initial ideal of socialist theory; in the party-centered political systems that have developed, the center of political decisionmaking has, through guidance, come within the parties. Among the relationships of this one-party and hegemonic party system--by this we understand the kind of model of a formal multiparty system in which a leading party permanently holds political power, while the other parties do not, even in the long run, strive to take it away--it results in only one alternative decision coming before parliament, which in a majority-based parliament cannot be contested by other solutions, and this also results in the plenary session of parliament having for the most part only "red-letter days." Naturally it is possible--in thought--to have political proposals supported by several parties contested in parliament, but this would suppose the existence of several parties. Party-based representation may be brought up, but we do not hold this to be either the sole nor the best possible solution. We see the essence of the problem in the fact that a new institutional system has not heretofore come into being in the socialist state, while the environment of the system has altered substantially and fundamentally. The solutions so far, and attempts at them--which have already been introduced in the Hungarian technical literature¹--refer back to the one-time solutions of bourgeois state development. Setting down our standpoint unequivocally, we may say that we do not see any prospect in the revival of party-based representation. At the same time, seeing the difficulties of improving the representational system, the slowness of the progress of attempts directed at bringing new frameworks into existence, we understand objectively those who are striving for improvement in this direction. To us, however, this kind of thinking not only appears unrealistic politically, but we are convinced that a return to the past system in this area does not even foreshadow progress.

On several occasions already it has been suggested that a divergence between the representative organs and the administrative organs manifests itself primarily in the fact that the former make decisions balancing the political interests of society, while the latter (chiefly those carrying out specialized administrative tasks) are actuated primarily by professional rationality.² These arguments are usually a response against comparing lay representation to an administrative organization possessing professional power. They are based on the premise that professional decisions may be separated from political decisions. This, however, is true in our opinion only to the extent that it may be determined that a decision is basically of a political or of a professional character. If, however, it is possible to decide this (naturally with the proviso that every

primarily professional question has some sort of political aspect, and vice-versa), then we must leave the deciding of predominantly professional questions to experts. In vain do certain people say that deputies, balancing political viewpoints, are capable of selecting from among alternative decisions that also contain professional aspects; professional incompetence will leave its mark on their response. Nor should we leave out of account the fact that while one power mechanism prepares recommendations, it will not prepare alternative proposals. If however, it is forced to do so, for there is a possibility of this, then one of the alternatives will objectively surpass all the others in every respect; again, therefore, no real possibility of choice exists. Nor should we forget that in this society articulated from interests not only decisionmaking, but also decision-preparation, is permeated with interests; on account of latent interest stirrings, substantial interests already pervade this stage, and thus not only do the real professional decisions originate earlier, yet outside the walls of parliament, so do the political decisions.

The various norms--and among them not only legal ones, but political ones, as well--continually stress the superiority of parliament over the government. Within the framework of this, however, the constitutions place the weight of responsibility of the Council of Ministers predominantly on compliance with the laws, in accordance with that traditional notion that demands fundamental legality from the administration. This is naturally an important condition of the functioning of the administration, but it is possible to demand this from a special communal administrative agency rather than, let us say, from a government of a country, the highest criterion of whose activity is success.³ Naturally, success and legality are not unconditionally mutually exclusive concepts, but the government's situation is stabilized primarily by the results it has achieved, in recent decades, chiefly by the economic product, while a government that operates in an extraordinarily legal way, but is unsuccessful, is forced to resign.

The legal forms of responsibility to parliament might be the following: a) reports; b) answers given to a deputy's interpellations; c) controls over the highest organ of state power manifesting themselves in another form.⁴ Broken down in more detail than this, the following are already differentiated from each other; oversight over observance of the laws, supervision of the fulfillment of the national economic plans, oversight over the implementation of the state budget, and finally, verification of the fulfillment of tasks set forth in the government program (where that is, the government is obligated to appear before the deputies with a material program).⁵ Nor do such detailed analyses get beyond a proclamation of the principle of superiority, since there is likewise no implementation of responsibility on the part of parliament, and thus certain sham attempts to demonstrate it turn up.

The implementation of oversight over the government may for that reason achieve great significance, since the improvement of the activity of parliament, inter alia, must be directed at this. An important question is, within what kind of organizational framework can oversight over the government be carried out? We may select from among the following solutions: the plenary session of the representative organ, or some sort of committee formed in part from its members, should handle the task, or we should create a separate organ to manage this,

or finally, we should also locate the mechanism assigned to this within the framework of the presidium. Presently the overwhelming majority of states choose the last solution, on grounds of constitutional or legal control. Beyond this, even in the guidance of the organs of people's control, the presidium receives stronger rights than the government.

Naturally, development in such a direction is also conceivable in our country; even so, we do not give it our vote. The solution that fits our conception best is if the committees of parliament politically oversee the specialized central agencies of administration (for this, we could put a small cadre of experts and a data bank at their disposal); oversight over the general conduct of government and administration, however, would be handled in part by the plenary session of parliament directly, in part by an organ created for this purpose. This latter organ would be directly created by parliament partly from deputies, partly from experts. This organ would, moreover, also coordinate the oversight activity of the committees. Guidance rights would be exercised predominantly by the plenary session of parliament, to a small extent by the presidium. This organ would function in complete independence and separation from the government, one of the objects of oversight. Naturally, this solution, too, is not completely unknown in the socialist states; with small discrepancies the 1980 Polish law concerning the Supreme Oversight Chamber established similar regulations.⁶ There is no doubt, however, that as a consequence of the changes of the last 3 years, it would still be premature for us to speak about the experiences of the functioning of the organ.

We may characterize the relationship of government and parliament by two relations: the government on the one hand initiates and on the other hand executes. These are the two elements that practically "grip parliament in a vise" from two sides. Thus the government prepares a draft of the plan for the budget and for socioeconomic development and submits it to parliament; it organizes and oversees the execution of the laws that are passed and makes a report on this to parliament; finally, during the course of all this, it issues decrees and decisions in order to fulfill these tasks.⁷ Since guidance of the strategies of policy (here we are thinking of policy in the strict sense and not of sectoral policy) falls outside of the state organization, and the government has also become primarily an economic cabinet, its activity, too, is directed predominantly at handling this task. The action of parliament (since these questions require extraordinarily wide professional groundwork and coordination), the raising of the proposals to the force of law, validates the decisions of the leading bodies of the Party to dismiss certain ministers in case of failure (usually at the time a government is formed following regular elections). Nor may it be accidental--wide comparison bears this out--that in the socialist states the classic political portfolios (foreign affairs, internal affairs, defense) may be held the longest, the reason for which is in part that the actual political guidance of these is done by the central party organs, and on the other hand that results, or lack thereof--chiefly under peaceful or relatively stable conditions--are less measurable here. Thus for every "difficulty" the economy "bears" the consequence of failure, and the heads of the organs carrying out planning or functional guidance change.

The proof of the activity of the government is that it not only initiates the foregoing laws of an economic character, but in the Soviet Union, for example, all the "first principles" (at the union level, that is, they establish the principles of civil law, civil procedures law, criminal law, and criminal procedures law, and the individual republics write the codes on the basis of these⁸). In Czechoslovakia, however, until September 1964, that is, for 16 years from the start of the turn to socialism, the government initiated all laws.⁹ To the question of execution we add only that from this angle, the wide authorizations extended by parliament and the framework character of laws enacted give abundant freedom of movement to the government.

In the socialist states, too, it has been pointed out that in the relations of government and parliament the norms of the constitution do not always prevail in reality. Although statutory provisions prohibit the delegation of the sphere of authority of the representative organs to administrative organs¹⁰ (in the majority of socialist states the government is regarded as the highest administrative organ), this occurs nevertheless, and moreover in two ways: the one is the issuing of authorization laws, in which case the delegation is open;¹¹ the other is when the sphere of authority of the representative organ is not comprehensively defined, and the jurisdiction of the administration is extended in the form of constitutional practice, to the detriment of parliament.¹² The legislative organs meet rarely and for a brief period, and one part of their tasks is handled by the presidium, or rather, a presidency or other work organ is usually created within the presidiums, as well, but the Party separately guides the work of the government.¹³ Between parliament and government personal intertwinements are also discernible. In a majority of socialist states members of the government may not be exclusively deputies; the deputy's mandate is not incompatible with simultaneous membership in the government. In our country this proportion is relatively low; among members of the government only five presently hold mandates as deputies. The dual function may be a source of contradictions, for his constituents rightly call the "disinterested" minister to account for the effective representation of their own local interests.¹⁴ The deputy can presumably assert these interests more effectively when he also fills a high state position. Although it is of secondary importance, if we increase the activity of the representative organ and strengthen its oversight activity, the question arises whether it would not be necessary to completely separate membership in the government and the representative function, as already prevails everywhere--with the exception of Romania--in the relation of government and presidiums. Participation of members of the government in sessions of parliament is obligatory, according to the regulations of the Council of Ministers.¹⁵ In the interest of being able to integrate the activity of the various state organs as thoroughly as possible, between 1957 and 1960 the government continually invited to its sessions the president of the National Assembly, along with the president of the NET /Presidium of the People's Republic/ and the president of the municipal council, as well.¹⁶ In this, too, there is expressed the fact that the government coordinates the activity of the whole state, since the government carries out the actual direction of the life of the state. Today we have no knowledge of such intertwining.

According to the rules of bourgeois parliamentarism the debate on the government's program assures the representative body of the opportunity for oversight.

For a shorter or longer time we in the socialist states shelved the utilization of this institution. The more recent socialist constitutions make the preparation of such a program obligatory for the most part. The governments comply with this within their own limits. The programs concentrate primarily on economic issues, which is less surprising, since the chief task of these organs is the management of economic life, and economists often head the government, as well. A solution is conceivable whereby in the case of a more significant change in the composition of government personnel (chiefly when a change also occurs in the head of the government) there should also be occasion for amending the government program and for debating it anew.¹⁷ The scope of the programs also shows a wide spread. The presentation of the government possesses somewhat greater significance in those states where it receives its authority from a single head of state, and thus there is a need for a material strengthening of parliament.¹⁸ We cannot overestimate the significance of this, but we must mention that the government program, which is basically an institution of bourgeois parliamentarism, may be regarded as more important where the institutional system also better reflects this tradition.

Nor has the institution of reporting hitherto been lacking--in some cases in contrast to the program--from the practice of the highest organs of power/representation of the socialist states; this, however, is struggling with almost the same problem as the first. If it is not primarily the parliament that enforces responsibility vis-a-vis the government, in either a political or a legal respect, what then may be the consequence of the reporting? Independently of this, a significant result is that everywhere today a declaration is made of the obligation to report. On the basis of the report parliament makes a decision in which it perhaps designates the kind of issues to which the government should devote greater attention. The demands of jurisprudence also aim at condensing these reports. Mukszinov, in connection with the union republic Councils of Ministers, and Vasziljenkov, in connection with the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, propose that the government should from cycle to cycle give an account of its activity on at least two occasions.¹⁹ Among the facts we must mention is that these general reports have little significance, for the government is primarily an economic cabinet, and even heretofore it has regularly reported on its work within the framework of the final accounts and the report on the plan.

We have turned our attention so far to the relation of the whole parliament and the government; the activity of individual deputies, however, may also manifest itself vis-a-vis the government. The means of this is the interpellation, which continues to exist, albeit with a modified function (for the interpellation is no longer the posing of a question of confidence to the government), as well as the right of questioning. The sphere where interpellation comes into full play shows at the same time an extensive range, for the leading officials of almost every type of state organ may be interpellated. The two solutions are difficult to distinguish from each other;²⁰ since the right of questioning is more amorphous and is not followed by debate or voting, it is feared that it will "swallow up" the institution of interpellation. Since the function of interpellation has also changed, that is to say, deputies do not primarily raise political claims, but rather call attention to the problems of their election districts, or seek a more favorable distribution of financial resources

for them, the reaction of the one questioned or interpellated is also modified. He does not seek a change in transportation policy, but, as has indeed occurred, only that a branch line not be discontinued. Naturally, even these claims have "grand policy" aspects, but considerably more indirectly than does the practice of the similar institution of bourgeois parliaments. About these there is no wonder, for interpellation carries no risk, while the one questioned has no responsibility primarily to parliament for the fact that the heads of the questioned organs disparage this institution. "Time and time again we observe that the deputy acting out of the public interest does not receive a suitable answer; some civil servants treat this action as one among many. At other times, clerks of modest duties and spheres of authority struggle mightily with matters of the sort with which the minister should personally deal"--said Bela Biszku at a session of the National Assembly in January of 1967.²¹ Ten years later the members of the Budapest parliamentary delegation were urging a clarification of the institution of interpellation.²² The one questioned (in general, an interpellation is directed not to the entire government, but rather to certain ministers) is required to respond within a definite time orally or, following the session, in writing. Diverse lengths of time are available for doing this: in the Soviet Union, for example, it is 3 days, in the DDR 2 weeks. Should a dispute develop over the question, the matter is referred to some committee, which thoroughly investigates it. It is unfortunate that time and again long months pass without a decision on the merits. This problem now leads from the session of parliament to the functioning of the committees.

II. Parliamentary Committees and the Government

Its committees presumably play a more significant role than the plenary session of the representative organ, and they could probably carry out still more important work if certain circumstances did not limit them. In the field of production management and of the economy in general, it has been a truism since Galbraith's famous book that in the 20th century it is not the individual, but the group, the committee, that is the form really capable of decision.²³ This statement increasingly applies to politics, as well. Political guidance, too, is imbued with more and more strictly professional, technical-technological, financial and economic aspects, and even from the political angle only several well-prepared specialist-politicians are capable of comprehending this. Today in the legislative body of every socialist state committees are organized from the deputies. These bodies can carry out considerably more substantive work than the plenary sessions sitting for a few days.

In this area we must answer several basic questions. In his study entitled "Prospects for the Development of the Highest Organ of People's Representation in the Socialist State," which appeared in 1963, Janos Beer raises a majority of these questions.²⁴ Let us try to answer them largely in accordance with our own conceptions. Although the 1936 Soviet constitution makes mention only of temporary committees, a system of standing committees has gradually developed, utilizing the latitude of the framework of the constitutional regulations. Although the socialist states have adopted this solution, the distortions that have ensued in the life of the states, however, not only have not been favorable to the improvement of the work of the representative organs, but have had an especially unfavorable impact on the development of the committees. In our

country National Assembly Resolution No 1 of 1956 orders modifications pointing in the direction of raising the activity of the representative organ and of democratization. Nine committees were to be formed instead of four, and mention was also made of the more frequent establishment of temporary committees.²⁵ Similar changes with smaller phase-shifts were enacted elsewhere as well. In Poland this occurred at the eighth session of the Sejm, likewise in 1956. The new Polish regulations established in 1956 raised the number of committees from 7 to 19, thereby insuring organizational conditions of wider oversight and more active functioning.²⁶ Naturally, how many standing committees the highest representative organ forms, how often it establishes temporary committees, is a necessary but not sufficient condition of successful operation. We may observe a positive direction of development over the past two decades. In the Soviet Union, the XXIII Congress of the CPSU decided on plans in this direction, which were implemented within a short time.²⁷ The goal was the implementation of continuous oversight over the organs of state administration. At the same time they introduced the practice whereby the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union regularly reports on its work at a session of the Supreme Soviet. In Poland, the Sejm has had 22 standing committees already since 1972, which is the highest among the socialist states. What is worthwhile bearing in mind from this solution is the bringing of these organs into harmony with the central organs of state administration. There are committees corresponding to the individual portfolios or groups of portfolios and supreme authorities, and thus the question of which committee has oversight jurisdiction over them cannot even arise.²⁸ In our country, whereby 10 standing committees are presently in operation, it would be worthwhile to proceed in this direction, which, taking into consideration the diminishing number of ministries, would not even require particularly great changes. At the same time it is worth considering if, until then, we should avail ourselves more frequently of the possibility of establishing temporary committees, on the one hand in those areas where standing committees have not yet been organized, on the other hand for continuous oversight of the execution of each law.²⁹

The committees are presently composed exclusively of deputies, and in given cases they are incapable of reacting on the merits to statements of administrative heads bombarding them with a deluge of data and information on the pretext of giving a report. There are several possible lines of development: thus it might be possible to link the committees with experts on important economic, social and cultural subjects and with societal organizations. The Czechoslovak solution appears equally good--here the chamber also invites specialists working in the field of science and practical life to session of standing or temporary subcommittees composed of its deputies.³⁰ In our opinion, a line of development is also conceivable whereby, in addition to deputies, scholars of the theory and practice of a given field, on a permanent (that is, for one legislative cycle) and temporary (to investigate a definite subject or subjects) basis, should be drawn into the committees. Members who are brought in on a permanent basis would have the right to vote. Among them not only representatives of science, but politicians who have gone into retirement, could also find a place. Over and above the individual committees an expert body would function with a small staff with the character of a secretariat, in the interest of preparing business and of keeping the committee members continuously informed. The thus-strengthened committee would be qualified for an oversight role of a political nature over a

given administrative area. The committees could summon and give a hearing to anyone; it would not be possible to cite secrecy before them. Their sessions, with necessary exceptions, would be public. The committees would have their own standing orders, simultaneously approved by the plenary session of parliament (this is necessary for the sake of harmonizing them). They themselves would not create norms; the resolutions concluding their investigations, however, would be published, perhaps in summary, in a publication established for this purpose. They could initiate the enactment of statutory provisions, or further oversight, in parliament or in the presidium. One of the organizational units of the NET /Presidium of the People's Republic/ would ensure continuous coordination, but this would not extend beyond technical conciliation activity. An interesting question is who among the deputies does not presently take part in the work of one or another of the standing committees. The experience is that where the committees already have a relatively effective role even today, deputies who are politically active by profession become strongly connected with the work of these organs. At the same time this may improve the collaboration of the central Party organs and the committees on the level of work relations, and may increase the respect of the committees and the political knowledge of their members.³¹

The main area of activity could be issues of economic policy, the relation of the population and the administrative organs, and the provisioning of the population. In the Soviet Union, for example, the plan and budget committee of the Supreme Soviet begins detailed debate of the plan, as well as of the budget, several months prior to approval. For the debate of the 1969 budget, for example, the 2 houses organized 32 subcommittees altogether, these deliberated more than 100 times with the involvement of more than 200 deputies, while the full body of the plan and budget committees at 27 times. The president of the committee, at a session of the Supreme Soviet, supplements the proposal of the government with separate remarks.³² This practice has come into general vogue in the socialist states. On important state matters, the central state organs are obliged to consult the committees, they may request information from members of the government, and these are obliged to appear at a session of the committee and provide the desired enlightenment. Things detected in committee work time and again serve as the basis of an interpellation.³³

The relation between the government and the committees exists in such a way that these committees are concerned with the activity of the individual branches, but their conclusions often have an all-government aspect, as well. Their present situation, with further improvement, holds out the following hopes: the respect of parliament will grow, the almost exclusively administrative approach of state action will disappear, the activity of deputies will increase, and the role of state participation in political power, together with other measures, will also grow. It is because of this that we do not extend our viewpoint on the plenary session of parliament to the entire functioning of parliament. This view of ours is based primarily on the hopes we attach to the committees. Over and above this, we hold worth considering the more frequent establishment of temporary committee and the setting up of an occasional standing judicial committee, for overseeing the legality (and not merely the constitutionality) of lower-level statutory provisions, as well as the legality of the quasi-legislation of the Supreme Court. Possessing wide initiating jurisdiction,

this committee would handle this task.³⁴ The solution, moreover, is not unknown in the socialist states, since in Romania an organ with similar tasks is already operating within the framework of the Grand National Assembly.

On the basis of all these things we may conclude that the activity of parliament relative to government may be improved; that is, we feel that we still find an unutilized opportunity, primarily in connection with the activity of the committees, that does not even require numerous comprehensive reforms, and that makes advance possible.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Peter Schmidt, "Representative Organs in Present Hungarian Society," VILAGOSSAG, Nos 8-9, 1981, pp 560-67.
2. Cf. Peter Schmidt, "Competence and 'Lay' Democracy," TARSADALMI SZEMLE, No 7, 1963, pp 59-60.
3. Cf. Tamas Sarkozy, "Jogi felelosseg a nepgazdasagban" /"Legal Responsibility in the National Economy"/, Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, 1983, p 93.
4. "Organizarea si activitate de stat RSR," Bucharest, 1974, pp 314-15.
5. Cf. V. Navara, Federalnoje Szobranijje--verhovnuj predstavityelnuj organ CsCzSZR, BULLETIN CESKOSLOVENSKEHO PRAVO, Nos 2-3, 1977, pp 194-95.
6. Cf. L. Garlicki, "Nowa regulacja kontoli panstwowej w PRL, PIP, No 11, 1980, pp 3-18.
7. A. Burda, "Parliament in the Polish People's Republic," Ossolineum, 1978, p. 49.
8. Sz. Sz. Kravcsuk (ed), "Szovjetszkoje goszudarsztvennoje pravo," Moscow, Jurigiyicseskaja Lityeratura, 1980, p 512.
9. B. V. Scsetyinyin, "Osznovu goszudarsztvennoje prava Csechoslovackoj Szocialiszticzeszkaj Reszpubliki," Moscow, MGU, 1972, p 45.
10. Cf. I. Ny. Kuznyecov, "Kompetencija vuszsih organov vlasztyi i upravlenyija SZSZSZR," Moscow, Jurigiyicseskaja Lityeratura, 1969, pp 150-51.
11. In our country, for example, Act XVI of 1946, whose force was later extended, was of this kind.
12. Otto Bihari, "A szocialista allamszervezet alkotmanyos modelljei" /"Constitutional Models of Socialist State Organization"/, Budapest, Kozlekedesi es Jogi Kiado, p 240.
13. Cf. V. Gsovski and K. Grzybowski, "Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," London/The Hauge, 1959, pp 20-21.

14. Cf. Imre Takacs, "The Government," in "Allam- es Jogtudomanyi Enciklopedia" /"Encyclopedia of Political Science and Jurisprudence"/, Vol II, Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, 1980, p 1019.
15. Point 45 of Mt. /Council of Ministers/ Resolution No 3580/1977.
16. "Proceedings of the VII Congress of the MSZMP," Budapest, Kossuth, 1960, pp 169-70.
17. S. Berenyi, J. Martonyi, and L. Szamel, "Magyar államigazgatasi jog, altalanos resz" /"Hungarian State Administrative Law, General Section"/, Budapest, Tankonyvkiado, 1978, pp 203-04.
18. B. V. Scsetyinin, "Osznovu goszudarsztvennovo pravo CSSZSZR," p 46.
19. Cf. I. S. Mukszinov, "Szovjet Minyisztrov szojuznoi reszpubliki," Moscow, Jurigiceseszkaja Lityeratura, 1969, p 9, and P. T. Vasziljenkov, "Szovjet Minyisztrov SZSZSZR--vuszsij iszpolnyityelnuj i raszporjagyityelnuj organ goszudarsztvennoj vlasztyi Szovjetszkovo Szozuza," VESZTNYIK MGU, szerija 12., pravo 1974., Nov 6, p 6.
20. Cf. Istvan Kukorelli, "Parliamentary Interpellations in Hungary, 1949-1980," JK /expansion unknown/, No 6, 1981, pp 478-479.
21. Bela Biszku, "A part es az állam a nep szolgalataban" /"The Party and the State in the Service of the People"/, 2nd ed, Budapest, Kossuth, 1975, pp 136-37.
22. Cf. Antal Adam, ed, "Allampolgari alapismeretek" /"Fundamentals of Citizenship"/, Budapest, Kozlekedesi es Jogi Kiado, 1979, p 227.
23. Cf. J. K. Galbraith, "The New Industrial State," Budapest, Kozlekedesi es Jogi Kiado, pp 100-03.
24. Cf. Janos Beer, "Szocialista allamepites" /"Socialist State-Building"/, Budapest, Kozlekedesi es Jogi Kiado, 1968, pp 130-31.
25. Cf. National Assembly Resolution No 1 of 1956, Part III, points 3, 4.
26. Remarks of Andrzej Burda, in "A szocialista alkotmanyok fejlodese" /"The Development of Socialist Constitutions"/, Budapest, Kozlekedesi es Jogi Kiado, 1966, p 83.
27. Cf. "Matyeriali XXIII szjezda KPSZSZ, Moscow, Politizdat, 1966, p 77.
28. Cf. W. Popkowski, "Niektore probleme dzialalnosci komisji Sejmu VI. i VII. kadencji," PIP, No 2, 1980, pp 37-43.
29. Lajos Torok, "Az állam ellenorzes szocialista rendszere" /"The Socialist System of State Oversight"/, Budapest, Kozlekedesi es Jogi Kiado, 1971, p 145.

30. J. Chovanec, "A csehszlovak szocialista allamszovetseg" /"The Czechoslovak Socialist Federation"/, Bratislava, Pravda, 1979, p 161.
31. D. R. Little, "Soviet Parliamentary Committees after Khrushchev, Obstacles and Opportunities," SOVIET STUDIES, July 1972, pp 48-49.
32. Cf. P. Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet: Politics and Legislative Process in the Soviet System," Durham, Duke University Press, 1977, pp 12-14, 132-34, 139-43.
33. Ju. L. Sulzenko, "Polszkaja Objegyinyonnaja Rabocsaja partyija i predstavityelnuje organu goszudarsztvennoj vlasztyi, PROBLEMU GOSZUDARSZTVA I PRAVA, No 8 (1974), p 216.
34. In my opinion, the Constitutional Law Council currently in the process of formation will probably handle this task only in part.

8971

CSO: 2500/274

INTRODUCING SPECIALIZED WORK GROUPS IN SCHOOLS PROBED

Budapest KOZNEVELES in Hurgarian 23 Mar 84 p 9

[Article by Sandor Suhai, director, Department of Education, Nagykanizsa:
"Should There be Economic Work Associations In the Schools?"]

[Text] We received the following article a few months ago. We meditated a long time about whether to publish it. Finally we decided to offer it to our colleagues, to discuss it together. By this debate we do not want to force anything either from the ministry or from the councils. We also think that a very sensitive topic is involved here, which can deeply affect the prestige of our profession. So this is one more reason not to urge measures by our comments but to endeavor theoretical clarification, a public meeting of the minds, which takes into consideration not only the expected benefits but also the possible losses.

We have practically nothing to add to the article. It is a wise and circumspect piece of writing which inspires responsible replies. It clearly indicates that this topic which appears to be economic in character also poses several professional and ethical questions. Perhaps it can not be considered accidental that practically no example can be found in history for private and semiprivate initiatives similar to the GMK [Economic Work Association] in state schools. But who knows? Perhaps some wise proposals will come to light which will also move the cause of education and child raising forward. In any case the pedagogical society has always required debate on essential questions in which nothing has yet been decided, which are completely open. Well, this is one of them. (The Editor)

Through its order No 28/1981. IX. 9. the Council of Ministers made it possible to establish economic work associations in national economy's production and service spheres. The order created new, theretofore unknown opportunities and we can not shut off our educational and child rearing institutions either for long from the effects of these.

Using the opportunities provided by the regulation work associations were set up here, too, one after the other, in industry and in the area of services. Some people agreed with their creation, others voiced reservations. Anyway, our department was not too interested in this topic as long as the colleagues sensed only a theoretical possibility of organizing GMKs in the pedagogic institutions. But in March our departments received requests for authorizations for work associations in the most diverse areas (body culture, strength-muscle-calisthenics). This was when we looked into the applicable statutes and began to look for the ones which apply to education.

We found no uniform and guiding implementation instructions in the statutes for GMKs that could be organized in the discipline's area. We have only a brief and too general position by the county which does not exclude the formation of economic work associations, and even encourages them in certain areas--for example, in teaching languages.

But in our county, practice contradicts the theoretical possibilities defined in the above mentioned position. I must honestly say that in the beginning I was a solid believer, and perhaps even initiator of the more rigid practice. Primarily for ethical considerations I did not consider and even today I do not consider the organization of GMKs permissible in the child raising and educational institutions of Nagykanizsa. This is because I am not convinced that the educator also active in the work association can in all cases separate the activities conducted during class hours and in the work association. But if someone could convince me about the possibility of this, I would have doubts about whether the parents would also believe this.

The work associations related to body culture--in my opinion--cause fewer problems. It should be clarified, however, whether the physical education teacher can also work with his own students or only with students he does not teach, or perhaps only with students of another school.

Let there be no misunderstanding, what bothers me is not the possible increased income of the teachers, but its unfavorable effect. I consider putting the matter of financial recognition into order if we wish to deal seriously with the meritorious further development of the cause of our education. But now it creates a problem that only a narrow stratus of educators have an opportunity for higher earnings. And also the fact that in some cases the members of the body culture GMK could earn outstandingly high incomes, 4000 to 6000 forints for little work (4-6 hours per week).

Recently the high school mathematics-physics and the foreign language teachers also desire to establish GMKs in our city. And my worries are further increasing with this, even though I recognize the significance of every activity of tutoring, special study groups and preparation outside the class periods.

This is because in the interest of high school graduation and successful college entrance tests which mean continued education, most parents are truly willing to make even serious financial sacrifices. This is the practice today even without any GMKs. But by authorizing these work associations we are

legalizing something the effect of which we are unable to measure accurately. My basic problem continues to be what will be the relationship between educator, student and parent if all three know that the sole source of the educator's significantly higher than usual extra income is the parents' wallet.

I think the question is justified: How will all this influence the classroom work done in school; will the objective and fair evaluation suffer; will the modestly paid activity outside the school's classroom hours be excessively degraded; how will the colleagues in other specialities tolerate the inequality of opportunity thus developed which will not affect the educators?

I would like to receive reassuring answers to these. I would like to find out the opinions of my educator colleagues about them.

8584

CSO: 2500/295

FATE OF SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES WEIGHED

Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 11 Apr 84 p 5

[Article by Zsuzsa Ferge: "Social Welfare Today and Tomorrow"]

[Excerpt] Social policy is increasingly becoming a subject of discussion. The explanation appears obvious: The economic situation has grown more difficult, and social problems have increased. But this is not by itself reason enough. In economic situations that were bad or much worse 10, 20 or 30 years ago, social problems were not quite at the center of discussion. Problems existed, but they were not publicly debated. To be able to approach a problem openly, it is necessary above all to have a politically-minded public at large.

There are many views about social political tasks, and these do not change as a function of historical periods. There are some who have maintained and still maintain that social policy must concern itself with the casualties of society, the members who are unable to look out for themselves, and it must ease poverty; according to others, workers' protection is the most important. The view is becoming ever more popular that social policy is the means of better realizing distribution according to work. By contributing to the maintenance of dependents, it contributes more clearly to the realization of differences in the work incomes that shape lifestyles. There is truth in all this. In that research work, however, which is now being prepared by the MTA [Hungarian Academy of Sciences] under state commission and the task of which is to clarify the long-term principles of social policy and the possibilities and means of promoting them, we have proceeded, on the basis of a critical analysis of present practice, from a deeper background.

Emergency Solutions

We must face the issue whether there is a contradiction between the long-term principles of social policy, its increasing tensions, and its economic possibilities. The economy has already carried out significant redeployments, above all in order to hold our ground in the international arena. First of all, the impetus to fulfill our obligations has led to a significant reduction in accumulation, and to a less significant but perceptible reduction in real wages. At this cost we were able to achieve something of a growth in social political funds, although this was insufficient as compared to the wants. According to indications, further possibilities for macro-level redeployments are tremendously

limited. This is how we arrived at several new steps, or the strengthening of earlier trends--or as we might arrive according to various proposals--for dealing in principle with "state" or central social-political tasks. These are:

1. in the case of collective facilities, the shift of (a part) of the costs directly to certain defined groups of the population as charged to their personal incomes or free time (construction or maintenance of collective facilities, nurseries, and so forth);
2. the same kind of shift in the case of infrastructural benefits for individual use (housing, telephone, the installing of water pipes in the provinces, and so forth);
3. reduction of supports or an increase in the schedule of charges for "services in kind" in a general or differentiated manner depending on the users' ability to pay;
4. the reduction of the real value of many social political incomes, with or without subsequent correction;
5. in social allowances, both money and kind, the principle of "universal" entitlement which has been in general use up to now will be restricted to a greater or lesser extent in favor of "the principle of need" as linked to a judgment of the individual case, which--apparently--will make it possible to use resources more effectively.

In addition, the reduction of the population's purchasing power by means of price increases is not social-political in nature but is social in its implications, and the same is true of skimming off the income of certain groups, for example, by taxation or by raising the social security contribution.

There is no room here for weighing one by one the advantages and disadvantages of each step. But in any event, we should draw attention to two important points that need to be considered. One is how the given steps qualify from the long term perspective. The listing from one to five also depends on this. In the case of the first one--the shift to the collectives--a virtue could be forged of necessity over the long term, and the modification of certain conditions (for example, increased local autonomy, the strengthening of the public character). The local (enterprise, and so forth) collectives would understand their needs and their orders of priority better than any center, regardless of how well informed a center may be. According to indications, enterprises, and the like, that are established by their own will and decisions appreciate those matters better. Therefore, if more ample resources become available, it is conceivable, in fact desirable, that a new kind of distribution of resources, rights and tasks should take place between the center and the small collectives, primarily settlements. The other extreme, the extension of "the principle of need" appears the most problematical, whether we are considering individual assistance or a larger system (for example, a health facility). It is likely that we will need a network of well-trained "social workers" which in cooperation with other specialized networks offering sundry services and provisions will help families solve

their difficulties and understand and realize their interests and rights so that they may live in a more human way. But the question of what they should live from should not be made a matter of chance, and this determination cannot be given even to a well-trained network. Therefore (if and when the general-type incomes, the minimum wage, the family allowance, etc. cannot be expected to reach in certain cases a level in line with the socially acceptable minimum), it is necessary to work out the objective condition system of entitlement for "assistance" or for a livelihood supplement which enables the family to calculate its requirements and avoid arbitrary judgements.

The other aspect of weighing and evaluating emergency solutions is: How do they affect the various population groups that are living in better or worse circumstances?

In the case of many measures--for example, the large scale and above average increase in the lowest pensions, the progressive increase in the pension tax, and the rise in prices for certain luxury items--the interest of those in a poorer situation were taken into account. In other instances, on the other hand, either their interests were slighted (for example, in the stagnation of the family allowance for families with more than one child) or--as in price on fee increases--the outcome is uncertain, that is, it may be assumed that the situation of the poorer will be endangered.

Calculability

The basic intention of this article is to call attention to three problems:

--It would be good to introduce greater calculability into the system even in deteriorating and uncertain situations. This does not only mean making the assistance more calculable. It could be stated, for example, that after price increases of a certain magnitude a portion of the loss should be compensated in the case of certain allowances or incomes below a certain level.

--In redeployments or reductions we should avoid such institutional and systemic changes (for example, individual judgment of "need" or dual systems) from which it would be difficult to return to a system that is better in principle and, to judge by all foreign experiences and rational arguments, the social harm would be greater than the short-term economic benefit.

--We should devote more attention to estimating what is the likely effect of the individual measures on the better or more poorly situated groups or to see to it that the groups with the weakest or poorest capability should receive greater protection in social political distribution, as well as in other areas of life--production and distribution. These groups belong among those who have nothing more from which to give, and further burdens would force them inevitably to the brink. With this, social burdens will only increase, not to speak of grave individual difficulties. In making such "estimates" research could apparently give more points of support to decisionmakers.

KUBIAK COMMENTS ON CULTURAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION ACTIVITIES

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish No 60, 10-11 Mar 84 p 2

[Article: "On the Eve of the PZPR National Delegate Conference Hieronim Kubiak, Chairman of the PZPR Cultural Affairs Commission, Speaks to PAP"]

[Text] The CC Cultural Affairs Commission has held 14 meetings. These meetings were also attended by PZPR Sejm deputies, civic activists involved in culture, artists, publishers and journalists. Three of the meetings were organized jointly with the Cultural Affairs Commission of the United Peasants Alliance (ZSL), the Presidium of the National Cultural Council and the Cultural Affairs Commission of the National Council of the Patriotic Movement of National Revival (PRON). Our commission has made three surveys of cultural institutions, two of them operating in working-class areas in Kielce and Lodz, and one in the countryside in Pozman voivodship.

The commission's primary aim has been to translate the principles of cultural policy formulated at the Ninth Congress into the language of political practice. We have tried to help combine the prerogatives of state patronage with a healthy tendency toward self-management. Self-management among artists, in cultural movements and in cultural establishments should strengthen state patronage, not negate it. This is what we had in mind, for example, when we supported the legislation setting up the National Cultural Council and the Cultural Development Fund. This also lay behind the commission's strenuous efforts to bring artistic associations back to life and ensure that they play a proper role in developing and implementing cultural policy. The commission also came up with the initiative, which received the very active support of the Sejm Culture Commission, to begin work on definitive legislation which would regulate a series of problems involved in the dissemination of culture. This legislation should safeguard the status and improve the living conditions of those professionally engaged in disseminating culture, while holding on to the "life blood" of culture, i.e. the needs of the civic activists involved in it.

Moreover, the commission assisted in the reorganization of the Polish film industry and in establishing a legal framework for protecting Poland's cultural heritage and developing Polish museology. Work on all these things should be finished this spring. For the first time we'll have a legal system which allows our cultural policy to coincide with the needs of the state and all sides concerned.

The commission has paid a lot of attention to the cultural needs of working-class and rural communities and small provincial centers. We wanted to prevent any repetition of the situation that once existed, when access to culture was unequal. Signs that this might happen again became noticeable in the mid-70's. Our work to prevent this happening has involved consistent and varied efforts to improve the state of publishing.

CSO: 2600/939

PZPR CONFERENCE DELEGATES DISCUSS PROCEEDINGS

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish No 70, 22 Mar 84 pp 1, 2

[Article by DIK: "Honest and Energetic Work Is Needed"]

[Text] Throughout the country party meetings are being held which are being attended by the delegates to the Ninth Congress, conferees at the PZPR National Conference. They show a lively interest in the proceedings at the Warsaw meeting, and in the atmosphere of the deliberations.

The delegates are trying to satisfy this interest. But this is not confined to that area of interest alone. The delegates, first of all, are replying to questions as to what in the results of the National Conference will be most fitting to the conditions and expectations of the particular environments whose matters the party organizations are supposed to immediately take up. These meetings, therefore, are supposed to be somewhat like extensions of the National Conference, deep into the party, and in reaching the primary party organizations are supposed to revivify the activeness of the entire party. The significance of the Conference of Delegates will only be proven by what the party does on a practical basis during the next weeks or months.

Zielona Gora: Consolidate the Activeness of the Primary Party Organizations

--How to relate the decisions and conclusions of the National Conference of PZPR Delegates to the needs of party work in the local areas, how to strengthen the activeness and aggressiveness, responsibility and criticism, in the primary party organizations--those where the main themes of the postconference meeting of the town and gmina party aktiv in Zary and the nearby towns and gminas of Leknica, Trzebiel, and Lipinki Luzyckie.

There was a large group of delegates in the hall: Jozef Orlovski, worker from the Glassworks Factory in Trzebiel and Jan Jancz, farmer from Dabrowa Luzycka, and the following came from Zielona Gora: Jerzy Dabrowski, Provincial Committee First Secretary Walerian Mikolajczyk, and Zbigniew Nieminski.

Familiarity with the achievements of the conference throughout the party ranks, it was said, will help to revive the party organizations and groups. The

workforces and the community should know what our demands are, what we want and what we are doing. Those attending the meeting considered how to apply the party line and its program to local conditions and realities, to the endeavors around which the party organizations must rally their colleagues at work and their compatriots in the community or the countryside.

The proceedings in the problems groups, which concerned themselves with matters close to the participants, aroused a great deal of interest at the meetings. For workers in the Sulechów "Prodwodrol" these were issues of land reclamation and the laying of water pipelines into the countryside. It was acknowledged that during the course of the conference this matter which is very crucial to the farm and food economy was properly noted. But equally necessary is a prudent and far-reaching plan of measures utilizing the experience and observation from each enterprise's own area of activity.

Comrades from Zary, Zenon Sibilski, Bogdan Kilanowski, Jan Sierszulski and Ryszard Starzyk from Leknica, pointed out that the work at the lowest party levels confirms our solidarity and determination in service to the working people. The declaration "What We Are Fighting For, Where We are Going" is a summary of the collective thought and will of the party. We must translate this into action in our own places of work and residence, it was said.

Poznań: What is Most Important for "Wiepofama"

Roman Machowicz, delegate to the PZPR National Conference, attended a meeting with members of the party chapter organization in the gmina section of the "Ponar-Wiepofama" Special Lathe Factory in Poznań. Many workers took part in the lively discussion. A great deal still remains to be done, they said, to improve work in the offices. Human relations in the workplace require greater concern. The party, too, must give more attention to these matters. But more effort must be directed at eliminating the sources which give rise to negative aspects, resulting in injustice and wrong, and harming the working people.

Replying to many questions on the declaration "What We Are Fighting For, Where We Are Going," R. Machowicz stressed that it will perform its role as a historical document if every PZPR member will, through his work and way of life, multiply the nation's moral and political force and the country's economy.

Łódź: Be a Co-Manager

Antoni Gieczewski, delegate to the Ninth Congress, met with a party group of councillors in the Łódź Baluty. He said that according to the conference the most important sociopolitical event this year will be the approaching elections to the people's councils. Participation in these elections, the councillors said, will best serve to support the line of national conciliation.

Questions concentrated on problems of social parasitism and the symptoms of pathology in our everyday life, demoralization, fair distribution of material goods, the personal enrichment of some people at the cost of society, and uneconomical management in industrial plants. The opinion was expressed that it takes more to improve that which is crippled than passing appropriate resolutions.

This problem, Gieczewski said, has been dealt with in the decisions made by the conference. It was announced that the number of legal regulations which were to regulate social behavior has been reduced in favor of improving the effectiveness of those decisions that have already been made. This will also depend on the activeness of the people. The law on people's council makes it possible for them to feel that they are the co-managers of their own environment.

Krosno: Unify the People

At the meeting of delegates to the National PZPR Conference with the party aktiv of the Krosno Province, conducted by Henryk Wojcik, first secretary of the Provincial Committee, consideration was given, in the context of the elections campaign for the people's council, to how to conduct political work so as to unify the people of the Carpathian region to the line of conciliation and struggle and the reforms passed at the Ninth Congress. It was indicated that the party organizations should actively support PRON (Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth) organizations in explanatory and propaganda work.

--Laws alone are not enough, the essence of the new thinking and economic activity must be evident in industrial production.

As Jozef Dlugosz from AUTOSAN observed, the conference has some difficult but urgent conditions, which we must comply with in order to move forward. The factory aktiv felt the same way, he said, and expressed it in a discussion at a meeting in the factory immediately after our return from the conference. These feelings can be very briefly summarized in the statement: "The time has come for honest work, in order that the party resolutions are implemented in practice."

Wloclawek: In Agreement With the Assumptions on Ideology

In the Wloclawek "Azoty", the workers' conference of the provincial socioeconomic aktiv with the delegates for the National Conference attending took on the character of a dialogue on the way the decisions of the Warsaw forum could be translated into a language of concrete actions in the primary party organizations. The Central Committee secretary on economic reform, Henryk Bednarski, took part in the proceedings.

--Realism and consistency in placing matters before the conference, Jozef Marczewski, welder from "Azoty" said, should be an example for the daily work of the primary party organizations.

Stanislaw Kwiatkowski and Stanislaw Reczyk called attention to the conditions which the application of the assumptions of economic reform carry with it.

--The essence of ideological activity, Helen Jankowska from Radziejow said, is that the substance of everyday party activity conform with the ideological assumptions of socialism. Those attending the meeting considered this criterion to be one of the primary conditions for the implementation of PZPR National Conference of Delegates decisions in the Wloclawek Province.

PZPR STRUGGLES, ALLIANCES DEFENDED

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 1, Jan 84 pp 27-39

[Article by Stanislaw Wronski: "The Battle Scene"]

[Text] During the previous term, the party went through a tough ordeal, By party, I mean the organization as well as individual members. Not only we, but almost everything had to pass a test of ideological integrity and political reason, of personality and social attitudes, of clean hands, consciences and intentions. Consequences of dismal mistakes, deviations and violations of socialist principles both in public life and in ideology came to light. There is no way to continue for long a policy of living on credit, to ignore the socialist "pay-proportionately-to-work" principle, to violate the principles of workers' democracy in building a system free of all exploitation and oppression and based on efficient, creative work.

This is not the place or moment for discussing the set of factors which led to the acute socio-economic and political crisis that swept Poland from August 1980 onwards. These factors have been, in a general outline, identified and presented by a special commission created by the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress.

It seemed inconceivable that friendly Polish-Soviet relations, which had unfolded and developed in the previous decade, should be challenged by anyone who was impartial and responsible in his commitment to Poland's national interest. Viewed objectively, nothing had happened that might affect or weaken Poland's good relations with the Soviet Union.

The mistakes and deformations, which brought about the working people's wrath in August 1980, had been made as fully sovereign decisions, at least in full sovereignty with regard to the Soviet Union. The party and state leadership of the time was, in fact, so unimpeachably sovereign in its policies that it even refused to listen to warnings or to avail itself of experiences gained through reforms and prudent policy management by some of the brotherly countries. Instead, it boasted vaingloriously of Poland's imaginary economic miracle, nourished its conceit and megalomania to the point of self-ridicule.

Or, regarding trade with the Soviet Union, nobody can really prove that goods sold to the Soviet Union could instead have been marketed in the West or elsewhere, or that goods Poland bought in the Soviet Union could have been

bought cheaper in capitalist countries. No way. In this respect, Poland was in a good position, both regarding its overall trade structure and its economic effectiveness. Had Poland oriented itself more strongly, and for longer periods, to the Soviet market, to mutual cooperation and specialization, the benefits it drew would have been much greater, and no less important, much more resistant to business cycles in the West.

Polish-Soviet economic relations are beneficial to both sides; this is what accounts for their stability. Contracts with Soviet firms are coveted by other countries, by big capitalist corporations, precisely because these contracts afford considerable profits. Not always did Poland's sovereign governments adequately appreciate all the possibilities and uses latent in Poland's economic orientation to the Soviet market.

But, perhaps Polish moods were affected by developments in Polish-Soviet cultural cooperation? Anyone familiar with this area of cooperation will presumably regard this as an unnecessary question. Indeed, if this cooperation is approached not in terms of commercial benefits but in a way relevant for cultural cooperation, this cooperation will be seen to have enriched cultural life in both countries. Nothing can substitute for our respective literatures in either country. The same holds for movies, theaters, music or the fine arts. All these are indispensable in developing better, more open, and friendly social attitudes and societies in general. This precisely is the overall effect of Polish-Soviet cultural relations. We are getting to know each other better and are enriching each other. The Soviet peoples know and highly appreciate Polish cultural accomplishments. Poles reciprocate this feeling. This truth has been repeatedly confirmed in recent years, though Polish artistic productions were rather more noticeable in the Soviet Union than Soviet ones in Poland.

Cooperation in science and technology, too, was advantageous to Poland, helping to resolve many long-term problems in both countries.

Finally, take the matter of territorial integrity and peace, which is of supreme significance to the Polish nation.

Invariably and with all its might, the Soviet Union used to drive predators sharpening their teeth on our borders into the cage of security. The alliance with the Soviet Union strengthened, and strengthens, Poland's independence, its rank in the world, and it is an important factor of peace in Europe.

It would seem, then, that the post-August crisis should not have triggered attacks against the Polish-Soviet alliance or friendship. Poland's state and national interest was to protect these relations, not to let them get involved in the internal conflicts which broke out at the time.

During the first strikes in the Gdansk region, anti-Soviet slogans were quickly removed by somebody's hands. It would seem that whoever was for renewal in the nation's interest would pledge his clear, firm and unequivocal commitment to the alliance with and friendship of the Soviet Union.

However, other intentions were soon articulated. The cat was let out of the bag when the Solidarity Trade Union was registered. Under pressure from ultimatum, the union leaders conceded to include the clause, "without affecting the established system of international alliances." Shortly thereafter, union activities furnished eloquent evidence of how [union leaders] treated this provision. Numerous Solidarity publications and speeches by some of its top brass stirred unprecedentedly massive waves of filthy anti-Sovietism.

Let us leave it to chroniclers to record this ignominious action and the methods employed in it. I mention it not to provoke a discussion about it but only to consider its causes and the conclusions to be drawn for the future.

A full-swing attack was launched against almost all areas, and almost all the history, of Polish-Soviet relations, starting with the October Revolution up to recent days.

This anti-Soviet and anti-socialist campaign culminated in demonstrations with provocative slogans in several cities on 11 November 1980. Early the following year, it was revitalized with new ferocity and ingeniousness, with still greater cunning. A wave of leaflets, appeals, telex messages, graffiti, poor poems and caricatures swept over Poland. Anti-Soviet publications, and vilifying brochures were openly shown in exhibitions and distributed; provocative pseudoscientific symposia were held. In Solidarity showcases, there were posters, leaflets and slogans denigrating the Soviet Union and Polish-Soviet relations. School textbooks of Russian, as well as history, were burned in Warsaw's Old Town Market-place. This is reminiscent of a bleak past, of [Nazi] swastikas. Anti-Sovietism was also demonstrated in the area of culture and research, among other things during the Opole [Polish pop music] Festival, in Gdansk [sic], in many cabarets. These actions were crowned by desecrations of the graves of Soviet soldiers, Poland's liberators.

Records of filthy actions, degrading Polish national pride and actually back-lashing on Poland itself, would produce a long list. We pointed this out when protesting such actions during the all-Polish conference of Polish-Soviet Friendship Society (TPPR) activists in June 1981, during the TPPR Board's October 1981 plenary session, and at many meetings of [TPPR] representatives.

We invoked society's political reason, because we realized that an overwhelming majority of workers, peasants and sober intellectuals were having nothing to do with adventurist Polish reactionary centers entrenched in their hatred of the Soviet Union.

What was the cause of that fierce, relentless anti-Soviet action, if it had had no objective justification and simply threatened Poland's national interest? The answer is simple. This cause was the old class hatred of the workers' authority and people's democracy, of socialism and communism. It was that militant hatred which first manifested itself in the capitalist crusade against the victorious October Revolution 65 years ago; the same hatred which gave birth to fascism and unleashed a second "crusade" against the Soviet Union 42 years ago; the same hatred which threatens the world today with nuclear mayhem. This is the simple truth.

Those behind attempts to dissemble socialism and fuel anti-Sovietism in Poland have a long provenance. It is no accident that they have taken as their hero [Polish pre-war leader Marshal] Jozef Pilsudski, who had not fought a single skirmish against the imperialist Drang Nach Osten [Pressing on Eastward] but himself pressed on toward the east, into ethnically non-Polish lands. In doing this he defended not our national interest but those of the possessing classes. He can no longer be venerated except by followers of new "expeditions" to the east, by designers of anti-communist "crusades."

TPPR activists encountered actions launched by an enemy who clad himself in national colors, abused symbols of the [Home Army] AK's struggle against the Nazi invaders, and invoked ancient grievances and resentments and stirred latent emotions. Emotionally reacting people notoriously fail to respond to charges of lack of reason. Exhortations of political reason leave such people unresponsive. Yet, let us not write off such appeals for common sense. When emotions subside, people start to do their thinking. We will welcome anyone who, although he was insensible yesterday, will stand on the side of Poland's state and national interests.

TPPR activists were exposed to pressures, threats, anonymous letters and phone calls, and various other sophisticated morifications. Our organizations sustained considerable losses at that time, as TPPR board and voivodship branch board reports at election meetings show. Nothing short of hysteria over an imminent intervention from the East was aroused at a time when anti-communist centers in the West stepped up their interference in Polish affairs, propping up counterrevolutionary forces inside Poland, blackmailing the government with threats to tighten the debt noose and cut off vital Western supplies, and increasing their propaganda campaigns.

Allegations were spread that all Polish miseries stem from the Soviet political model Poland had adopted or, supposedly, been forced to adopt. This theory obviously bolsters anti-Soviet feelings. TPPR activists were facing very tough problems.

To be able to disprove such and similar theories, they had to command experience and considerable knowledge. Homogeneity of political principles, in fact, does not result from enforcement or a mechanical imitation of state organization patterns. Socialist principles were assimilated by the Polish revolutionary worker not later than by the Russian revolutionaries. These principles arise from human societies' needs and are identical everywhere--in Russia and Poland, in Cuba and Vietnam. In very rough approximation, they can be said to involve basically building a society free of all exploitation and oppression, a society governed by social justice based on social ownership or production means, by a social consciousness and morality which has been purged of egoism, and by creative work compensated in proportion to productivity. Such a society does not develop automatically or naturally, but by deliberate, organized human action; hence derives the principle of the [communist] party's leading role in a people's democracy. These are universally valid outlines of a "model" of socialism, which hold for all socialist countries. They generalize the most profound social ideas, and not forms, methods, rates, order of tasks, cultural or traditional specifics, under which these ideas are to be implemented and which account for the "specificity" of socialism in different countries. Construction of

socialism in Poland proceeds today in a different mode and produces different forms, which is conspicuous and evident for everyone today. The Soviet Union did not fetter Poland in the latter's independent search for, and cultivation of national identity. In so-called mass culture, Poles did not succumb to Soviet but to Western patterns, which were often debilitating or morally destructive. Soviet governments did not force Poles to compromise their national traditions in selecting their mode of building socialism. Indeed, whatever enforcements did occur were made fully independently.

A similar thing can be said of state and economic reforms now and in the past. Administrative reform was basically tailored to the French model. The economy was reformed according to our own blueprint, borrowing from different corners, unfortunately not always with welcome effects. Unlike in the Soviet Union, Polish authorities cultivate their relations with the [Roman Catholic] Church, pursue their own models of agricultural development and industrial management, and abide by their own system of political institutions within which the Party discharges its leading role. This list of "differences" can be extended.

Alas, these differences also include some peculiarities of the Polish "model" which do not stem from Polish national culture, tradition or conditions. Sometimes they derive from stagnation, at other occasions from arbitrary decisions which violate either the injunction to respect national specificity or that to respect the overall principles of socialism. This was precisely what caused the deformations in Poland, and what played into the hands of socialism's enemies.

Also, there were very remarkable views implying that a special kind of reform was needed for the political and social foundations of Polish-Soviet relations. At first, a few individuals, and later a group of 35 persons well known for their political activities came up with a challenge to the PZPR as the architect and leading force in Polish-Soviet relations of friendship, alliance and cooperation. Instead, they proposed "Poland's presence in the Warsaw Pact and in the Comecon," which "the whole Polish nation" is ready to guarantee. It is funny that an odd group of 35 people should proclaim the whole nation's readiness to fulfill the role of guarantor of Poland's presence in the Warsaw Pact and in Comecon. The nation did not, and could not, give such a mandate for assurances of its readiness to anyone. It includes people of varying degrees of readiness to do different things. We are a class society. Besides, in their statement, the 35 played down the extent of anti-Soviet excesses, saying that they are isolated events.

At that time, too, the TPPR came under critical fire from some people who inexplicably charged the organization with never having been contentious in its activity, but did not specify their point. They advanced the vague proposal that the TPPR create a small working team for some indefinite rapid-response actions.

One overt infringement on the obligation not to undermine Poland's alliances and foreign-policy principles was the First Solidarity Congress' appeal to the working people of Eastern Europe, which was a kind of encouragement to follow the Solidarity leadership's example and to imitate this Polish development in other socialist countries. That was an open provocation, which we responded to with our "Appeal to Polish Society" in which we called on Poles to oppose the counter-revolutionary forces' anti-Soviet campaign.

Such actions by these forces, who had connections with foreign anti-communist centers, were pushing the country into an increasingly difficult situation month by month.

What was the TPPR's line of defense in response to this?

I decided to abide by the 10th TPPR Congress line and not to throw overboard carelessly long-proven forms, ideas and methods of activity but to submit them to new tests under these difficult conditions.

TPPR activists instinctively resented their enemies' questioning of the entire body of socialist Poland's accomplishments. Despite the enormously difficult post-war take-off, with towns and villages in ruins and with the inherited economic backwardness, despite mistakes made on the road of new development, the selfless effort by millions of people, who were led by the party at all stages, the results were an accomplishment of historic dimensions. Revolutionary socioeconomic transformations bore fruit in higher living standards for a majority, in cultural advancement for millions of people, and in stronger international position. A simple comparison of how things looked earlier and how they look now, despite the acute shortages of today, confirmed and continues to confirm this truth on all points.

However, it will be remembered that under the impact of nihilistic attitudes and their own embarrassing remembrance of participating in the compromised so-called propaganda of success [in the 1970's], many persons became silent, not even trying to mention their accomplishments. But the record of past accomplishment has always been the strongest argument we have in favor of socialism. This argument, however, must be supplemented with new, practical evidence in the form of effective activity to man's benefit.

Refuting claims made by scoffers clad in national colors who question socialist Poland's accomplishments, the TPPR Board stated in January 1981, "Poland was never as much its own self as it is now, both in its national substance [sic] and in its ancient, historically inherited land, in its national identity, and in cultural development tendencies. As a nation we can be proud not to have appropriated anything that was not Polish and not to have relinquished anything that was Polish since our birth as a nation. We owe it precisely to socialism and to the Polish-Soviet alliance to be able to say this."

Socialism and the alliance have also involved years of struggle and toil from July 1944 to this day, the difficult years of the country's reconstruction, industrialization, of overcoming the Polish worker's and peasant's social and cultural oppression, the years of the Cold War, all that period of persistent attempts to widen international recognition for socialist Poland's accomplishments and a reasonable, constructive foreign policy. Poland's sense of living within safe borders amidst friendly neighbors and security was consistently growing in the face of threats to peace.

Would this all be realistic and so obvious had there been no alliance and cooperation with the Soviet Union? The answer is supplied by historical facts, by reality itself. Nobody can honestly deny this. All this has been recorded in

history in the assets column of the Polish nation's balance sheet, which is buttressed by the powerful Polish-Soviet alliance, by Polish-Soviet cooperation, by the socialist countries' potency.

Owing to these, Poland could successfully resolve its major national and social problems. Knowledge of these facts is indispensable for shaping every Pole's civic consciousness. This, in turn, offers prospects for future developments, gives new strength and reassures people in the face of difficulties.

A powerful, friendly Soviet Union is needed by an independent Poland. A strong, friendly and independent Poland is needed by the Soviet Union. This is the underlying structure of mutual relations between the two nations and states, and it was proclaimed by the two governments when they laid foundations for friendly, mutual relations.

Yet, we have realized all along that more could be done and that no success can mislead us to self-complacency as long as any human need remains unsatisfied. This is why we derive our optimism from the party's policy of revitalizing the nation's creative energy, of socialist renewal. We have repeatedly pointed out that the Polish-Soviet alliance, cooperation and friendship are, from the historical vantage point, a most innovative, creative concept and force of development. This has been confirmed in practice.

There can be no socialist renewal in Poland without simultaneously strengthening the alliance and cooperation with the Soviet Union and with the whole community of socialist countries. This contention is true in two ways--socialist renewal will strengthen friendship, and stronger Polish-Soviet friendship will serve the cause of socialist renewal. In other words, this will serve the cause of Poland, of the nation. This was how we translated the party line of "Yes, to Socialism, No, to Deformations" in specific rules for our own activity at the TPPR.

The Polish nation's historical experience in its struggle for independence and social liberation, the tradition of joint revolutionary struggle of the best sons of Poland and of the Soviet peoples, Lenin's revolutionary legacy of struggle for international solidarity and for equal rights for all nations--which he so consistently underlined with respect to the Polish proletariat and to Poland--the sacrifice of blood and life by Polish and occupation, the brotherly assistance Poland got from the Soviet people in rebuilding the country and in safeguarding its borders, the present situation which gives ample evidence of Soviet assistance in overcoming difficulties--all these are paths of friendship which are constantly present in TPPR activity. In saying this, of course, we are not saying anything new. If we repeat this, it is only because it remains as valid as ever in shaping civic attitudes. The only thing which is new is the steadily expanding area of positive facts constituting mutual accord and friendship, that whatever previously disturbed and exacerbated relations between the two nations is receding into the past and losing its impact.

This brings us to so-called sensitive problems in the history of Polish-Soviet relations, which certain circles give loud publicity to in their alleged concern for truth and national memory, flaunting the hypocritical pledge to "defalsify" this history in an intent to call forth anti-Soviet attitudes. We want no

embellishment of negative facts from the past. But we firmly oppose bids to capitalize on them with a view to fomenting enmity between the two nations, to organizing hysteria about this, and especially attempts to concoct myths or downright lies in order to antagonize the two nations against each other.

It was the fierce militant anti-Sovietism of Polish governments representing the interests of the possessing classes who had lost their estates in the east after the October Revolution that generated many conflicts. These conflicts burdened Polish-Soviet relations in the inter-war period as well as during World War II. The possessing classes never relinquished their resolve to return to Ukrainian and Byelorussian territories which once had been held by the Polish monarchy or by the bourgeois Polish state. This, however, was never Poland's national interest, but their own private, egoistic interest in regaining their estates. They can be asked the embarrassing question, just what was the purpose of the armed seizure--from March 1919 onwards--of Byelorussian lands as far as the Berezina River? And, what was the purpose of Pilsudski's April 1920 invasion of the Ukraine, which took a great bloody toll on both sides and resulted in enormous damages? All that could have been avoided. There is evidence of this. The October Revolution unconditionally recognized the Polish nation's right to independence and unification of all Polish lands. This is known to everybody. Equally well known are the December 1919 and January 1920 Soviet notes to the Polish government proposing an accord, halting the shedding of workers' and peasants' blood, a truce at the front, which ran along the Drissa River and Borisev in the north to Bar in the south, and beginning peace talks. In the January 1920 note, the Soviet government wrote, "The Council of People's Commissars states that since the authentic interests of Poland and Russia are involved, there is not a single territorial, economic or other problem which could not be solved peacefully, by negotiations, mutual concessions or agreements." The Polish government's rejection of this proposal had well-known consequences.

Why did the Polish government torpedo the 1935 Eastern Pact initiative? Why did it turn down the idea of a multilateral military alliance with the Soviet Union, England, France and Romania which the Soviet government repeatedly proposed from May to August 1939 with a view to meeting jointly the Nazi Reich's military challenge?

After all, this particular Polish position was among the factors that unleashed the developments that proved tragical for Poland, for which the Soviet Union is groundlessly blamed. Effect is presented as cause. This is how those advocates of historical truth manipulate facts.

Why is the October 1938 armed invasion and incorporation of the Zaolzie region into Poland, which was done simultaneously with the Nazi army's entrance into Czechoslovakia, not criticized by those who describe the Red Army's seizure of western Byelorussian and Ukrainian territory after 17 September 1939, that is, after the Polish army's defeat at the hands of the Nazi army was evident, as "a stab in the back."

If those events are looked at honestly, then "a stab in the back" is a more adequate description of the 1 October 1938 entry of the Polish army into Czechoslovakia and forcing the Czechoslovak government to put up with Poland's seizure

of Zaolzie under an ultimatum of using military force. This fact is by no means allayed by England's and France's endorsement of Czechoslovakia's dismemberment in their 29 September 1938 Munich accord signed with Mussolini and Hitler.

Today, we know well that what the Western powers intended then was to get Hitler to turn his aggression to the east, against the Soviet Union. They were ready to pay any price for this to happen to the aggressor. Any price meant anything at the expense of other countries, such as Czechoslovakia or Poland, which were left to themselves by these Western powers in violation of treaty obligations on the battlefield in September 1939, to face a stronger enemy and thus doomed to defeat as soon as the battle began. Abandoned by its Western allies, Poland had lost its defensive campaign by 17 September 1939--which was obvious to everybody--because it had been doomed to defeat right from the start. The Nazi troops could have captured all of Poland's territory as far as the Zbrucz River. This was just a question of time. Under these circumstances, the Red Army's seizure of ethnically Byelorussian and Ukrainian lands east of the Bug River cannot be called "a stab in the back." It was, in fact, the first time the Nazi army was stopped in its eastward advance. Everybody at the time who had at least some idea of politics knew full well that a battle for life was bound to break out sooner or later at that front. And, that Europe's future would be decided precisely there, on the eastern front.

It is time for our fellow-countrymen who in the past and now have been looking to the West and expecting friendly help for Poland from there to shed their illusions. Experience is the best remedy for such cases. Since the time of Napoleon and the 19th-century Polish national risings through to September of 1939, and to this day, Poles have kept nourishing naive hopes and illusions, because the West provided only nice words, but no palpable aid.

The West's policies toward Poland have always been determined by self-interest, and implemented at Poland's expense. The 2-year old economic restrictions against Poland are the most eloquent of the recent pieces of evidence.

These are some of the embarrassing topics which Poles should keep in mind as warnings for the future, but these should not claim all our attention.

While not ignoring them in working out a proper concept for the promotion of Polish-Soviet friendship, we should primarily take up what brings the two nations closer to each other, what unites them. Friendship is born and grows on the basis of positive facts. It is in the two nations' mutual interest to popularize positive facts and to produce new ones in promoting mutually beneficial cooperation and understanding, respect and rapprochement.

Like any other great road, that of Polish-Soviet friendship is not free of humps. However, other than this road, there are only pathless tracks leading nowhere or to the [Napoleon-created Polish state] Warsaw Duchy; yes! I'm writing this deliberately, because it is to the size of the Warsaw Duchy that Poland would be reduced by anti-Soviet strategists, who relish exposing embarrassing topics, if they succeeded in pushing Poland off the road of friendship into the wilderness.

Economic relations are the next favorite target of attack. The enemy reached the apex of demogogy charging that Poland's economic crisis is, allegedly, an outcome of trade with the Soviet Union which is disadvantageous to Poland. This falsification was countered by a long television program in which representatives of several ministries and journalists participated, valuable publications by some authors, as well as a series of public lectures on the topic. However, these are merely first actions in this respect. Polish society does not fully realize that the Soviet Union meets 45 percent of Poland's total raw-material needs, or that Soviet shipments of raw materials, fuels and production materials clearly dominate Poland's total imports in this area, accounting for 75 percent of it (Poland gets 100 percent of its oil, natural gas, pig iron and asbestos, 76 percent of iron ore, 85 percent of potassium fertilizer, and 84 percent of cellulose from the Soviet Union). Buying such huge quantities in other countries would presumably be impossible, at least at prices and terms offered by the Soviet Union. In all, Soviet supplies in the post-war period included nearly 177.5 million tons of crude oil (88.6 percent), 45 billion cubic meters of natural gas (100 percent), nearly 3.1 million tons of cotton (66 percent), and more than 23.1 million tons of grain (24.1 percent). For instance, some 230 million tons of steel was made of Soviet ore supplied to Poland, which is three-fourths of all steel products ever made here--from needles and spoons to bridges. Soviet raw-material reserves enable Poland to look calmly at prospects for industrial production in the next century.

General Wojciech Jaruzelski told delegates to the 24th Council of Mutual Economic Assistance session, "An old saying is, in a family, among friends the rule is one for all, all for one; this rule was applied in the past, is being applied now, and, I hope, will be more and more broadly applied in the future." What Poland is going to get from this cooperation and what it is going to contribute to it are not two questions but one. Assistance helps overcome difficulties. The sooner the difficulties are overcome, the sooner it can again increase its contribution to resolving the problems of the whole economic community. Poland's chief opportunity for development lies precisely in this area. This is where optimism about the future has its font. This, too, is the main direction in which Poland is now channeling its foreign trade, specialization, cooperation, and international economic relations.

Polish-Soviet friendship, which is based on the vital interests of nation and state as well as on a Marxist-Leninist ideological foundation, is a most valuable and stable advantage. Even so, we must neither play down nor reject arguments which justify it in terms of "geopolitics." We must not do this because there are a number of Polish citizens who are persuaded precisely by arguments such as the one that Poland is situated in this particular part of Europe, and who consequently oppose anti-Soviet attitudes and anti-Soviet propaganda precisely because of this fact. This, too, is of some significance, and this, too, is valuable in its own way.

*

Due to their insufficient background, TPPR activists often suffered defeats when facing unfriendly audiences. We must self-critically admit that our activists often evaded this struggle, because they had no relevant materials or inspiration. The paramount question arises, what should TPPR activists do to improve the quality and effectiveness of their activity, to become more convincing?

The organization now has a chance to start a new phase in this. The following three circumstances may help the TPPR do this.

First, the enemy has fired all its ammunition, and these arguments of propaganda can now be recorded in a complete list.

Second, TPPR activists, who have been under heavy fire, now fully realize the intricacy of their position and know that unless they rid themselves of formalism, wordiness, oversimplifications, unless they can beef up their arguments and become more convincing, their audiences will receive them negatively, and they know they have either to mobilize themselves or not to go out onto the stage at all.

Third, TPPR activists are currently in a process of self-verification. Unproven people have left, or will leave, and only the dedicated, the ideologically hardened ones will stay. Although there are fewer of them than the others, these retainers know how to do their job and they may prove to be better organizers.

Other social organizations, including youth, women's and veterans' associations, have also been showing the first signs of a new readiness to cooperate with the TPPR. After a period of indecision or indifference, they are now ready to give evidence of their commitment to this cause.

While not overrating these positive circumstances and realizing that the situation remains differentiated, it can be said that there is a chance for overcoming the organization's weakness and for taking the straight road. We are not a petrified organization. Under difficult conditions, TPPR activists have proven themselves in rejuvenating the organization's ranks and diversifying methods of work.

One specific feature of our post-August activities was that, notwithstanding the defections and a certain slackness, almost all TPPR events and actions took a demonstrative meaning and acquired the character of class struggle. On the one side, there were socialist Poland's enemies, and on the other its defenders. The festival of Soviet songs in Zielona Gora and that of Russian music in Ladek Zdroj were staged because the local populations defended these events against cancellation calls by individuals standing under Solidarity banners. These latter used various pressures to liquidate or reduce Russian language competitions for schoolchildren, Russian poetry and prose reading contests, or theatrical competitions. These pressures were also felt when the TPPR organized October Revolution anniversary celebrations, or other events, and even meetings of TPPR circles at factories or schools. We could survive only as a fighting organization. Wherever TPPR circles failed to put up a fight, activity died down. Ideological, political struggle, although it is waged under different circumstances, will not die down in the nearest future, so it must remain a top concern of all members of TPPR authorities to be elected.

We want to, and can, remain an organization struggling for people's souls and minds, for attitudes. We want to, and can, be a massive multi-million member organization, because a vast majority of the nation is for accord, cooperation and friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Thirteen December 1981 which brought a firm "No" to those who were pushing Poland toward an abyss, was a turning point in Poland's future. We escaped the worst--civil war. And, we did this on our own! By our sovereign decision!

We should understand well the full meaning of this event. Where would Poland be now had this decision not been made? It was precisely this decision which saved our ability to advocate honorably Polish-Soviet friendship. We, patriots of socialist Poland, never wanted nor want now any heroes of civil war. Those who pushed for it will never be such heroes.

We do not want to succumb to any personality cult; what is needed is a cult of responsibility, a duty to the motherland. It proved there were people who had the courage to take the enormous burden of 13 December 1981, upon themselves. History will confer a just judgement upon them. The soldiers said, "It's better to sweat than to bleed." This is the essence of the 13 December decision. This, too, is the party line adopted by the 9th Extraordinary Congress, which is backed by all pro-socialist forces organized in PRON.

On an initiative of Comrade Jaruzelski, in October 1982, the PZPR Politburo approved a document called "Basic Guidelines and Tasks for Strengthening Polish-Soviet Friendship in Social Consciousness." It had been drafted by representatives of the United Peasants Party (ZSL) and Democratic Party (SD) Central Committees, youth organizations, and specialists from state institutions. Our cause was put into the hands of what is a broad front not just in name, but by actual participation of forces of friendship, alliance and cooperation between socialist Poland and the Soviet Union. Tasks defined in this document are addressed to all political and social organizations as well as to ministries and centers of the ideological front.

Its authors point out, among other things: "Under the new conditions, TPPR activity must undergo major changes in substance and methods. Superficiality, sloganeering and window-dressing must all be eliminated. Not quantity but quality and effectiveness of actions in shaping consciousness are decisive. TPPR activists must focus primarily on honest everyday work for explaining the essence of Polish-Soviet friendship and popularizing knowledge of the Soviet Union. TPPR should be more strongly oriented to winning individual members, to supplying them with indispensable knowledge of Polish-Soviet relations and of the Soviet Union, and to developing among members positive attitudes toward all symptoms of anti-Sovietism in keeping with individual interests. TPPR should actively promote and develop cooperation and exchange with the Soviet Union in areas of interest to all members of society. TPPR's character as a social organization should be strengthened, and nonprofessional activists should be granted a higher position in the organization. Party bodies and organizations should create a favorable climate and conditions for TPPR's activity, assign experienced activists to work in the organization, back TPPR initiatives and base-level organizations, help improve their material base and work conditions."

This Politburo decision was an inspiration for the TPPR Board in drafting the preliminary program of action for the next term which you [participants in the 11th TPPR Congress] have received.

Cooperation with all political and social forces and with governmental centers of the ideological front should be extended, and specific statutory forms must be given to it.

Some specific recommendations are already being put into practice, as the report says. Let me point out that, within the framework of cooperation with the Polish Academy of Sciences, a 1-year post-graduate study center on Soviet and Polish-Soviet cooperation has been operating since last October. It now has 135 students. Research materials prepared by professors from this center for students will be made accessible to thousands of high school history teachers.

A special working team has been appointed to study attitudes, as well as the propaganda effectiveness in promoting the idea of Polish-Soviet friendship. The TPPR has also created its own publishing office called Wspolpraca [cooperation], and its own tourist office which cooperates with the Orbis Travel Agency in organizing tourist trips to the Soviet Union.

We have started sponsoring a new bulletin, published by the Krajowa Agencja Robotnicza publishing house, which deals with Poland's cooperation with the Soviet Union. We are gratified to hear that a new club has been established by members of the Journalists Union of People's Poland (SD PRL), which includes 214 journalists specializing in matters connected with Polish-Soviet friendship.

A first, well-prepared series of lectures is being held at open TPPR meetings on the problem of "Who Is Undermining the Polish-Soviet Alliance and Why?" Some 2,200 lecturers trained at special seminars are discharging this job.

*

Further hard and great work is before us. Reporting and election meetings in voivodships have endorsed ambitious programs. In discussions at conferences, TPPR activists have proven their awareness of material, the political and ideological foundations of the Polish-Soviet alliance and friendship, of national and class reasons for reinforcing them. Elected boards have pledged their determination to act vigorously. Implementation of tasks is a job for all TPPR activists.

This is a NOWE DROGI version of a report the TPPR Board Chairman delivered at the 11th TPPR National Congress on 19 December 1983.

CSO: 2600/940

NEW ELECTORAL LAW PASSED

Warsaw ODRODZENIE in Polish No 9, 28 Feb 84 [no page given]

[Law on Elections to People's Councils of 13 February 1984]

Poland has a two-tier system of local government. The lower tier consists of "towns"; "gminas"--roughly the equivalent of rural borough, "incorporated boroughs" embracing a town which is not a separate administrative unit in itself along with the surrounding gmina; and "urban districts"-- subdivisions of the five biggest cities. The bodies corresponding to these administrative units (people's councils, electoral commissions, etc.) are collectively referred to in the text below as "local" bodies. The higher tier consists of 49 voivodships.--Editor's Note

[Text] Chapter 1

General Provisions

Article 1

1. The working people elect their representatives to people's councils from among citizens of unimpeachable moral and political integrity and civic commitment, who guarantee that they will properly perform the tasks involved in being a councillor and fully support the principles of the socialist system in the Polish People's Republic.

2. Elections to people's councils are conducted on the basis of an election manifesto prepared by the Patriotic Movement of National Revival (PRON), which unites society for the good of the Polish People's Republic and constitutes a framework for cooperation between political parties, civic organizations and associations, and individual citizens, irrespective of their world outlook, in matters related to the functioning and consolidation of the socialist state and the all-round development of the country as a whole.

3. Local election manifestos, which are linked to socio-economic plans and include economically feasible civic initiatives at local level, are drawn up in gminas, incorporated boroughs, towns, urban districts and voivodships on the basis of the election manifesto mentioned in Paragraph 2.

Article 2

Elections to people's councils in gminas, incorporated boroughs, towns, urban districts and voivodships are conducted in accordance with the principles and procedures laid down in this law and in regulations issued on the basis of this law.

Article 3

Suffrage is universal; all Polish citizens who are 18 years of age or over, on polling day have the right to vote, regardless of their sex, nationality, race, religion, education, period of residence in the polling district concerned, social background, occupation or material possessions.

Article 4

1. The following persons do not have the right to vote:

- 1) persons who have been declared totally or partially mentally incapacitated by a binding court verdict and are still incapacitated at the time of the elections;
- 2) persons who have been stripped of public rights by a binding court verdict and whose public rights have not been restored by the time of the elections.

2. The following persons do not take part in the voting:

- 1) persons serving a sentence of imprisonment or arrest;
- 2) persons in correctional institutions;
- 3) persons under investigative arrest.

Article 5

All persons who have the right to vote and satisfy the requirements laid down in this law may be elected to people's councils.

Article 6

Suffrage is equal; voters take part in the elections on an equal basis; each voter is entitled to cast one vote.

Article 7

1. Suffrage is direct; voters elect councillors directly to local and voivodship people's councils.
2. Votes must be cast in person.

Article 8

Elections are conducted by secret ballot; the polling station must include a polling booth which allows citizens to avail themselves in full of their right to cast their votes in secret; ballots are cast into ballot boxes in envelopes.

Article 9

The number of councillors in each voivodship people's council is decided by the Council of State, the following division of seats applying:

- 1) 85 percent of the seats are allocated to councillors elected from voivodship constituencies,
- 2) 15 percent of the seats are allocated to councillors elected from a joint voivodship list [joint list is used in this law in the sense of joint candidacy.]

Chapter 2

Calling Elections

Article 10

The Council of State calls elections to people's councils in the form of either:

- 1) joint elections, which are simultaneous elections to local people's councils and voivodship people's councils, or
- 2) separate elections, with elections to local people's councils and to voivodship people's councils being conducted on different dates.

Article 11

1. The Council of State calls elections to people's councils no later than 1 month before the term of office of these councils expires, setting the date of elections for a legal holiday no later than 3 months after the term expires.
2. The Council of State's resolution calling elections also specifies the final dates for certain procedures envisaged in this law (the election calendar).
3. The Council of State's resolution calling elections shall be published in DZIENNIK USTAW POLSKIEJ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ LUDOWEJ, no later than 75 days before polling day.

Article 12

The terms of office of local people's councils and voivodship people's councils begin on the day of elections to these councils.

Chapter 3

Number of Councillors

Article 13

The Council of State sets the number of councillors for each voivodship people's council; this figure shall be between 100 and 200.

Article 14

The respective voivodship people's councils set the number of councillors for local people's councils; this figure shall be:

- 1) between 120 and 150 for town councils where the town's population exceeds 300,000 people;
- 2) between 100 and 120 for town councils where the town's population is between 150,000 and 300,000 people;
- 3) between 80 and 100 for town councils where the town's population is between 50,000 and 150,000 people;
- 4) between 60 and 80 for town councils where the town's population is between 20,000 and 50,000 people;
- 5) between 20 and 60 for town councils where the town's population does not exceed 20,000 people;
- 6) between 60 and 120 for urban district councils;
- 7) between 30 and 90 for incorporated borough councils; and
- 8) between 20 and 50 for gmina people's councils.

Article 15

The number of councillors for any given council is set on the basis of the number of people living in the area covered by the council.

Article 16

1. A resolution of the Council of State on the numbers defined in Article 13 shall be published in the Polish People's Republic's official publication MONITOR POLSKI no later than 70 days before polling day.

2. Resolutions setting the number of councillors defined in Article 14 shall be published in the official publications of the respective voivodships no later than 70 days before polling day.

Chapter 4

Constituencies

Article 17

1. Councillors are elected to people's councils on a constituency basis, with the exception of those elected in accordance with Article 9 Item 2.
2. A constituency is part of the area covered by a given council.

Article 18

1. In principle, each constituency elects three to six councillors.
2. The number of councillors to be elected in each constituency is set in proportion to the constituency's population.

Article 19

1. Constituencies, their number, numerical designation and boundaries, along with the number of councillors they elect, are determined:
 - 1) by the Council of State in the case of elections to voivodship people's councils;
 - 2) by the presidia of voivodship people's councils in the case of elections to local people's councils.
2. The presidia of people's councils will inform electors of the resolutions mentioned in Paragraph 1 by posting bills no later than 65 days before polling day. These bills will also inform the public of the seat of the respective voivodship, town, urban district, incorporated borough, or gmina electoral commission.

Chapter 5

Polling Districts

Article 20

1. Polling districts shall be set up for the purpose of conducting elections.
2. Each polling district should in principle have between 1,000 and 3,000 residents.
3. Polling districts may also be set up for smaller groups of people if they reside over 5 km away from the seat of the nearest polling district.
4. Polling districts may also be set up at welfare institutions and homes for the disabled where patients permanently reside.

Article 21

1. Polling districts, their number, numerical designation and boundaries, along with the seats of electoral commissions in gminas, towns and urban districts, are determined by the presidia of the respective people's councils at the recommendation of the respective city presidents or the respective administrative officers of towns, urban districts, boroughs or gminas.
2. Resolution specifying the number, numerical designation and boundaries of polling districts, along with the seats of electoral commissions in each polling district, will be presented to electors by posting bills no later than 55 days before polling day.

Article 22

1. Commanders of military districts set up polling districts of between 50 and 3,000 electors in military units and determine the seats of electoral commissions in each polling district. These districts are included in voivodship and local constituencies which elect people's councils covering a territory with a population of over 30,000.
2. The numerical designation of polling districts described in Paragraph 1 is determined in consultation with the voivodship people's council presidium.
3. Commanders of military districts are obliged to inform the electors mentioned in Paragraph 1 of the creation of a given polling district, its numerical designation, and the seat of its electoral commission.
4. The provisions of Paragraphs 1-3 apply to military units, schools and colleges subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and to paramilitary detachments of the Citizens' Militia (MO), while the rights given to commanders of military districts apply to the commanders of these military units, the commanders of these schools and colleges, and the heads of voivodship internal affairs' offices.

Chapter 6

Electoral Commissions

Article 23

1. The following bodies are to be set up to conduct the elections:
 - 1) the State Electoral Commission,
 - 2) voivodship electoral commissions,
 - 3) town, urban district and gmina electoral commissions, henceforth referred to as local electoral commissions,
 - 4) polling district electoral commissions.

2. Incorporated borough electoral commissions are to be set up to conduct the elections of joint councils for town and surrounding gminas.

3. People serving on electoral commissions do so gratuitously and enjoy the legal protection to which public officers are entitled.

Article 24

1. The tasks of the State Electoral Commission include:

- 1) ensuring that the provisions of the electoral law are strictly observed,
- 2) considering complaints filed against electoral commissions,
- 3) presenting a report on the elections together with the relevant documents to the council of State,
- 4) announcing the final election results to the public.

2. In ensuring that the electoral law and regulations issued on the basis of this law are strictly observed, the State Electoral Commission will assist electoral commissions by providing them with guidelines and information as required.

Article 25

The tasks of voivodship and local electoral commissions include:

- 1) ensuring that the provisions of the electoral law are strictly observed in the area under their jurisdiction,
- 2) considering complaints filed against lower-level electoral commissions,
- 3) registering lists of candidates for councillors,
- 4) publishing information about the candidates,
- 5) distributing ballots to electoral commissions in polling districts,
- 6) calculating the election results and publishing them according to the procedure laid down in this law,
- 7) issuing a certificate of return to each candidate elected,
- 8) passing on the election documents to a higher-level electoral commission and the appropriate body of the state administration.

Article 26

The tasks of polling district electoral commissions include:

- 1) making the electoral register available to the public for inspection,

- 2) organizing the polling in the given polling district,
- 3) calculating the election results for the given polling district,
- 4) passing on the voting returns to the appropriate electoral commission,
- 5) passing on the ballots and other election documents to the appropriate local body of the state administration.

Article 27

1. The State Electoral Commission is composed of a chairman, 2-4 vice-chairmen, a secretary and 12 members.
2. Voivodship and local electoral commissions are composed of a chairman, 1-3 vice-chairmen, a secretary and the following number of members:
 - 1) 8-12 in the case of voivodship electoral commissions,
 - 2) 6-10 in the case of electoral commissions in urban districts and towns with a population of over 50,000,
 - 3) 3-8 in the case of electoral commissions in the remaining towns, incorporated boroughs and gminas.
3. Polling district electoral commissions are composed of a chairman, a vice-chairman, a secretary and 4-8 members.

Article 28

1. The Council of State appoints the State Electoral Commission and voivodship electoral commissions from among candidates proposed by the leaderships of those organizations which signed the Declaration on the Patriotic Movement of National Revival dated 20 July 1982.
2. The presidia of voivodship people's councils appoint local electoral commissions from among candidates proposed by the leaderships of those organizations which signed the Declaration of the Patriotic Movement of National Revival dated 20 July 1982.
3. The presidia of local people's councils appoint polling district electoral commissions in gminas, towns, and urban districts from among the electors, while the presidia of voivodship people's councils appoint polling districts electoral commissions in military units.

Article 29

1. The State Electoral Commission should be appointed no later than 70 days before polling day.
2. Voivodship and local electoral commissions should be appointed no later than 60 days before polling day.

3. Polling district electoral commissions should be appointed no later than 50 days before polling day.

Article 30

1. The Council of State shall set the regulations governing the work of the State Electoral Commission, voivodship and local electoral commissions, and polling district electoral commissions.

2. The Council of State shall produce:

- 1) fascimile seals of electoral commissions,
- 2) fascimile voting returns,
- 3) fascimile election records,
- 4) fascimile certificates of return.

Article 31

1. Members of electoral commissions are entitled to an allowance and a refund of travel expenses, the basis and amount of which shall be determined by the Council of State.

2. Employees who are absent from work owing to their membership of an electoral commission are entitled to their full salary and all other benefits resulting from their employment.

Article 32

The State Electoral Commission, voivodship and local electoral commissions, and polling district electoral commissions shall be dissolved by the Council of State once their work is ended.

Chapter 7

Electoral Registers

Article 33

1. Local bodies of the state administration draw up a register of voters permanently resident in the given gmina, town or urban district.

2. A voter registered as a temporary resident shall be allowed to vote in the place of his/her temporary residence against a certificate of eligibility to vote issued at his/her request by the local body of the state administration in the place in question. Names are entered in the electoral register in accordance with Article 64, Paragraph 3 of this law.

3. A voter who has received a certificate of eligibility to vote shall be struck off the electoral register in the place of his/her permanent residence following due notification from the local body of the state administration which issued the certificate.

4. A certificate of eligibility to vote may not be issued later than 7 days before polling day.

5. A voter who changes his/her place of permanent residence during the period referred to in Paragraph 4 may, at his/her request, be entered in the electoral register and allowed to vote in the polling district of his new place of residence on production of his/her identity document.

Article 34

1. Electoral registers are prepared in three copies for each polling district, and, in cases where a district includes more than one constituency, for each of these constituencies.

2. The register lists voters' names, surnames, father's names, dates of birth and places of residence. Each electoral register should bear the seal of the body which drew it up and the signature of the person responsible for this.

3. The Minister of Internal Affairs shall produce facsimile electoral registers and certificates of eligibility to vote, and shall also determine the procedure for drawing up and adjusting electoral registers.

4. The Minister of National Defense shall determine, in consultation with the Minister of Internal Affairs, the procedure of drawing up and adjusting electoral registers in military units.

Article 35

1. Electoral registers shall be submitted in duplicate to the chairmen of polling district electoral commissions no later than 42 days before polling day.

2. No later than 40 days before polling day, polling district electoral commissions will make the electoral registers available for public inspection at polling stations for 5 hours a day, at a time accessible to those working for at least 10 days.

Article 36

1. After the electoral registers have been made available to public inspection, claims may be lodged with the body responsible for drawing up a particular register regarding any errors found therein, in particular the omission or inclusion of given persons.

2. Such claims may be lodged either orally, and minuted, or in writing, through the offices of the polling district electoral commission which made the electoral register available to the public.

3. Claims must be investigated within 3 days of their being lodged.

4. Having investigated a claim, the body responsible for drawing up the electoral register may either:

- 1) supplement or correct the register, or
- 2) strike the person involved off the register, notifying him/her of the decision and providing due substantiation of this decision, or
- 3) dismiss the claim, providing the claimant with a substantiated decision to this effect.

Article 37

1. An appeal may be made against the decision to dismiss a claim or to strike a person off the register, this being lodged, either by the claimant or the persons struck off the register, with the district court with jurisdiction over the place where the register was drawn up. A copy of the decision being appealed against should be enclosed.
2. The court, sitting in the presence of a judge and two assessors, shall hold a hearing to investigate the case. The hearing should be held within 3 days of the appeal being lodged. The final ruling in such a case shall be substantiated by the court and submitted to the claimant and the body which drew up the electoral register. The final ruling is not subject to appeal.

Chapter 8

Proposing Candidates

Article 38

1. With a view to selecting candidates for councillors, a National Selection Committee shall be established, along with voivodship, town, urban district, incorporated borough and gmina selection committees.
2. The National Selection Committee shall be composed of a representative of the National Council of the Patriotic Movement of National Revival and representatives of the highest authorities of those organizations which signed the Declaration on the Patriotic Movement of National Revival dated 20 July 1982. These organizations may invite representatives of trade unions, professional organizations of farmers and socialist youth unions to participate in the National Selection Committee.
3. Voivodship selection committees shall be composed of a representative of the voivodship council of the Patriotic Movement of National Revival and representatives of the voivodship authorities of those organizations which signed the Declaration on the Patriotic Movement of National Revival dated 20 July 1982.
4. Town, urban district, incorporated borough and gmina selection committees shall be composed of a representative of the appropriate council of the Patriotic Movement of National Revival and representatives of local branches of organizations which signed the Declaration on the Patriotic Movement of National Revival dated 20 July 1982; the members of the given selection committee shall be appointed in accordance with the procedures defined by the National Selection Committee.

5. Voivodship, town, urban district, incorporated borough and gmina selection committees may also include representatives of trade unions, socialist youth union, professional organizations of farmers and other organizations; these representatives shall be appointed in accordance with the procedures defined by the National Selection Committee.

Article 39

1. The National Selection Committee shall begin its operations after giving notice to the Council of State that it has been set up. This should take place no later than 70 days before polling day.

2. The selection committees referred to in Article 38, Paragraphs 3 and 4, shall begin their operations after giving notice that they have been set up to the presidium of the relevant people's council. In the case of voivodship selection committees this should take place no later than 65 days before polling day, while in the case of town, urban district, incorporated borough and gmina selection committees this should take place no later than 60 days before polling day.

Article 40

1. The right to propose candidates for councillors to selection committees is granted to the Polish United Workers Party, the United Peasants Alliance, the Democratic Alliance, the PAX Association, the Christian Social Association, and the Polish Union of Lay Catholics, all of which are signatories to the Declaration on the Patriotic Movement of National Revival dated 20 July 1982.

2. The right to propose candidates for councillors is also granted to trade unions, professional organizations of farmers, the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy, socialist youth unions, the Women's League and other civic organizations of a mass character active in the voters' place of work or residence, and to the councils of the Patriotic Movement of National Revival and residents' self-government bodies in towns and villages.

Article 41

1. Selection committees shall draft joint lists of candidates for councillors on the basis of proposals put forward by the organizations specified in Article 40.

2. Voivodship selection committees shall draft joint lists of candidates for voivodship councillors elected from voivodship constituencies; there shall be a separate list for each individual constituency plus one joint voivodship list.

3. Town, urban district, incorporated borough and gmina selection committees shall draft joint lists of candidates for councillors of local people's councils; there shall be a separate list for each local constituency.

Article 42

1. Voivodship, town, urban district, incorporated borough and gmina selection committees shall present joint lists of candidates for public consultation with voters at pre-election consultative meetings; these consultations shall be organized by the Patriotic Movement of National Revival.
2. The consultations referred to in Paragraph 1 will be conducted at pre-election meetings involving the rural population, residents of particular urban districts or housing estates, representatives of various professions, and at meetings held at places of work and military units.
3. The pre-election consultative meetings involving the rural and urban population, referred to in Paragraph 2, may be attended by all voters residing or employed in a given polling district. Meetings organized at places of work may be attended by those employed there.
4. Pre-election consultative meetings are attended by representatives of the Patriotic Movement of National Revival candidates for councillors, representatives of those organizations which have nominated the candidates, and those involved in running the meetings on behalf of state bodies and selection committees.
5. The exact method of conducting pre-election consultative meetings and the procedure for consultations on candidates from voivodship lists shall be defined by the National Selection committee.
6. Appropriate local bodies of the state administration, or public enterprises appointed by them, shall guarantee the necessary conditions for holding pre-election consultative meetings.

Article 43

1. An authorized representative of the relevant selection committee shall present candidates from the joint list and request support for them at each pre-election consultative meeting. Should additional information about any candidate be required, it shall be provided by a representative of the organization which proposed the candidate.
2. Voters participating in pre-election meetings may move that a candidate be withdrawn from the list and replaced by a new candidate proposed by the selection committee. The motion to withdraw a candidate should be motivated and documentary evidence should be presented if requested by the candidate or by the organization which proposed him/her.
3. The motion referred to in Paragraph 2 may be adopted by a majority vote with a show of hands.
4. The proceedings of the pre-election meeting shall be minuted and the minutes sent to the relevant selection committee by the chairman of the meeting.

Article 44

1. Voivodship, town, urban district, incorporated borough and gmina selection committees, taking into account the results of consultations with the voters, shall draft joint lists of candidates for councillors.
2. A selection committee may only include in the joint list of candidates those persons who received the support of voters participating in pre-election consultative meetings.

Article 45

1. The number of candidates on a joint list should be twice the total number of seats for a given constituency.
2. The number of candidates on a joint voivodship list should be twice the total number of seats allocated to the list.

Article 46

1. No candidate may participate in any electoral commission in the constituency where his candidature has been presented.
2. A candidate may run for election to a people's council in any single constituency, provided he is a permanent resident of the area covered by the people's council in question or is employed in that area.
3. A candidate may run for election to a voivodship people's council either from a single constituency or from the voivodship list.

Article 47

1. The selection committee shall present the joint lists of candidates for councillors referred to in Article 44, Paragraph 1, to the relevant voivodship or local electoral commission. These lists should be presented no later than 30 days before polling day.
2. The list should be sealed and signed by the selection committee presenting the list.

Article 48

1. With the exception of lists referred to in Paragraph 2, all lists should be divided into individual seats. Every seat should be contested by two candidates, whose names should be given in the order agreed upon by the selection committee, together with their age, profession, and place of residence.
2. The voivodship list should contain the names, age, profession and place of residence of the candidates. Their surnames should be listed in the order agreed upon by the voivodship selection committee presenting the list and each should be numbered, beginning with the number "1".

3. The lists presented to electoral commissions should be accompanied by written declarations by the candidates that they agree to run for election from a given constituency or from the voivodship list. These declarations may be presented separately, although no later than the date specified in Article 47, Paragraph 1.

Article 49

1. The relevant electoral commission shall register each joint list of candidates in accordance with the provisions of this law, drafting a document certifying that the list has been accepted.

2. The Council of State shall prepare fascimiles of documents certifying that joint lists of candidates have been accepted.

Article 50

1. The relevant electoral commission shall refuse to register a joint list of candidates if the candidates or the list itself do not meet the requirements set out in this law.

2. In such cases, the electoral commission shall immediately instruct the selection committee presenting the list to meet the requirements in question within 2 days.

3. The selection committee may lodge an appeal against the decision referred to in Paragraph 1 within 2 days, taking the matter to an electoral commission of higher level.

4. The decision reached after the appeal has been considered shall be final.

Article 51

1. After the joint lists of candidates for councillors have been registered, electoral commissions shall publish the details concerning the candidates:

1) Voivodhsip electoral commissions shall publish the details concerning candidates for seats in voivodship people's councils.

2) Local electoral commissions shall publish the details concerning candidates for seats in local people's councils.

2. Details about candidates should be published no later than 25 days before polling day.

Article 52

1. In particularly justified circumstances, the electoral commission may--at the request of the selection committee, received no later than 10 days before polling day--strike off the name of a candidate and replace it with another. In such cases the provisions of Articles 49-51 apply accordingly.

2. Lists of candidates shall not be amended if the request to do so is received after the deadline specified in Paragraph 1.

3. Taking a decision to register an amended list of candidates for councillors, the electoral commission shall immediately publish the details concerning the candidates.

Article 53

1. Every candidate should attend meetings with voters after the lists are registered.

2. The meetings with candidates for councillors shall be organized by the Patriotic Movement of National Revival in consultation with the presidium of the relevant people's council and the selection committee. The appropriate local bodies of the state administration, or public enterprises appointed by them, shall guarantee the necessary conditions for holding candidates' meetings with voters.

Chapter 9

Ballots

Article 54

1. In accordance with the procedure set by the State Electoral Commission, an electoral commission that has registered a joint list of candidates orders the printing of the necessary number of ballots, these being printed separately for each constituency and for elections from the voivodship list, and ensures that these are delivered to polling district electoral commissions.

2. The requisite number of envelopes should be supplied together with the ballots.

Article 55

1. The names of candidates are printed on the ballots as they appear on the registered lists.

2. Ballots may only be printed on one side.

3. Ballots should bear the seal of the electoral commission.

4. The Council of State shall prepare facsimile ballots.

Chapter 10

Polling

Article 56

Polling takes place at polling stations from 6 am to 8 pm without interruption.

Article 57

1. The polling district electoral commission may consider polling to be over once all electors listed in the electoral register have cast their votes.
2. If polling closes early, the polling district electoral commission immediately reports this fact to the appropriate electoral commission and the local body of the state administration.

Article 58

1. Polling must not be interrupted. If, due to some extraordinary circumstances, polling is rendered impossible for a certain time, the polling district electoral commission may prolong the polling or adjourn it until the next day. The decision to prolong or adjourn the polling should be made public in the manner normally accepted in the given locality and forwarded to the relevant electoral commission and the local body of the state administration.
2. If polling has to be interrupted, the commission seals the ballot box and entrusts the chairman or another member of the commission with its protection. When polling is reopened, the commission must certify in writing whether the seals have remained unbroken.

Article 59

At least three people from the polling district electoral commission, one of these being the commission's chairman or his/her deputy, should be present at the polling station from the beginning of polling until the results are known.

Article 60

1. Selection committees may appoint representatives who have the right to be present at polling stations on polling day.
2. The council of State shall determine the rights of representatives and the procedure for allocating them to polling district electoral commissions.

Article 61

1. The chairman of the polling district electoral commission is responsible for order being observed during the polling and for the secrecy of the elections being maintained. He may issue appropriate instructions to this end.
2. At the request of this same chairman, the local body of state administration shall place stewards at his disposal.

Article 62

No campaigning is allowed at polling stations on polling day.

Article 63

1. Before starting the polling, the polling district electoral commission checks whether the ballot box is empty, whether the electoral register is at hand, whether there is a sufficient number of ballots and envelopes available and whether there are enough polling booths to ensure the secrecy of the vote. Having checked this, it closes the ballot box and seals it with the commission's seal.
2. The ballot box must not be opened from the moment it is sealed until the close of polling.

Article 64

1. Before casting his/her vote, each voter shows the polling district electoral commission his/her identity card or some other document attesting to his identity.
2. A voter who is entered on the register but does not have any of the documents required may ask two credible persons known to the commission to attest to his identity. The commission's decision regarding someone's identity is final.
3. The commission checks whether each voter is entered in the register or possesses a certificate of eligibility to vote; a voter presenting this certificate is subsequently entered in the register, with the commission keeping the certificate and appending it to the voting returns.
4. The commission presents each registered voter with ballots and an envelope.

Article 65

To prevent anyone from casting several votes, the commission puts a mark beside each voter's name on the register when issuing the ballots envelope.

Article 66

Having received the necessary ballots, each voter had the right to proceed to a polling booth located within the polling station.

Article 67

1. Each elector votes for as many candidates as are to be elected in the given constituency, in accordance with the division of seats shown on the ballot. The names of those candidates the elector is voting for--for each seat--should not be crossed out.
2. In not crossing out the names of either candidates for one or more seats, the elector thereby casts his/her vote for the candidate whose name appears on the ballot.

Article 68

1. In voting for candidates from a voivodship list, each elector votes for as many candidates as there are seats allocated to that list. The names of candidates the elector is voting for should not be crossed out.
2. In crossing out less names than the number of seats for the given list, the elector thereby casts his vote for those of the candidates whose names have not been crossed out, who appear first on the ballot.

Article 69

1. Electors cast their ballots into the ballot box in envelopes, in the presence of the polling district electoral commission.
2. Disabled electors may be assisted by other people when voting.

Article 70

At 8 pm, the chairman of each polling district electoral commission rules that the polling station be closed. Only electors who arrived at these stations before 8 pm shall then be allowed to cast their votes.

Chapter 11

Counting The Election Results In Polling Districts

Article 71

1. Immediately after the end of polling, the polling district electoral commission shall proceed to count the results.
2. Representatives of selection committees may observe the count.

Article 72

The chairman of the polling district electoral commission shall open the ballot box, whereupon the commission shall begin the count, this being conducted separately for each constituency and for the elections from the voivodship list. The count shall determine:

- 1) the number of ballots cast, i.e., the number of voters who took part in the polling;
- 2) the number of ballots cast that were classed as invalid, i.e., the number of invalid votes;
- 3) the number of ballots cast that were classed as valid, i.e., the number of valid votes.

Article 73

1. A ballot is invalid if:

- 1) it is different from the officially adopted one or does not bear the seal of the appropriate electoral commission,
- 2) it is wholly torn into two or more parts or wholly crossed out.

2. Entering other names on to the ballot, or any other inscriptions, entails no legal consequences and in particular does not affect the validity of the ballot.

Article 74

After counting the number of valid votes, the polling district electoral commission shall proceed to count the number of votes cast for individual candidates in the given constituency and candidates from the voivodship list.

Article 75

1. The polling district electoral commission shall produce voting returns in duplicate, this being done separately for each local constituency and the voivodship list.

2. The returns shall specify the number of:

- 1) persons eligible to vote, i.e. those entered on the electoral rolls,
- 2) ballots cast,
- 3) invalid votes,
- 4) valid votes,
- 5) valid votes cast for each individual candidate.

3. The voting returns shall also give the hours at which polling opened and closed and indicate in brief any complaints that were lodged and decisions made as well as any other significant developments. Representatives of selection committees are entitled to enter their remarks into this document and specify any concrete complaints they have.

4. The returns shall be signed by all the members of the polling district electoral commission present at the time of the document being drafted. The returns shall bear the commission's seal.

Article 76

1. The chairman of the polling district electoral commission shall immediately send, in sealed envelopes, one copy of the returns for the given district:

1) regarding elections to the voivodship council--to the voivodship electoral commission,

2) regarding elections to the local council--to the appropriate local electoral commission.

2. The chairman of the polling district electoral commission shall immediately send all documents relating to the elections to the appropriate local body of the state administration, doing so in the manner laid down by the State Electoral Commission.

3, The local body of the state administration shall keep the documents mentioned in Paragraph 2 until it receives further instructions from the Council of State.

Chapter 12

Counting The Results Of Elections To Local People's Councils

Article 77

1. As soon as it receives the voting returns specified in Article 76 Paragraph 1 item 2 from the electoral commissions for individual polling districts, the local electoral commission shall examine these records, correct any arithmetical errors, count the election returns for each constituency and next the returns of the elections to the appropriate people's council.

2. Representatives of selection committees may observe the count specified in Paragraph 1. The provisions of Article 60 shall be applied accordingly.

Article 78

1. A candidate for councillor shall be considered elected if he receives a majority of valid votes for the seat he contested, with at least half of those people eligible to vote in the given constituency having done so.

2. If both candidates for a given seat receive an identical number of votes, the candidate listed first is elected.

Article 79

1. The local electoral commission shall compile voting returns for the elections to the relevant people's council, this being done separately for each constituency. The returns shall be made out in triplicate.

2. The returns shall specify the number of:

1) people eligible to vote,

2) ballots cast,

3) invalid votes,

4) valid votes,

5) valid votes cast for each individual candidate.

3. Representatives of selection committees are entitled to enter their remarks in this document and specify any concrete complaints they have.

4. The returns shall be signed by all the members of the electoral commission present at the time of the document being drafted. The returns shall bear the commission's seal.

Article 80

1. The local electoral commission shall calculate the results of the elections to the relevant people's council, by compiling, in triplicate, the records of the elections, specifying:

1) jointly for all constituencies, the overall number of:

a) people eligible to vote,

b) ballots cast,

c) invalid votes,

d) valid votes,

2) separately for each constituency, the names of all councillors elected for the individual seats.

2. The representatives of selection committees enjoy the privileges specified in Article 79 Paragraph 3.

3. The records shall be signed by all the members of the electoral commission present at the time of the document being drafted. The records shall bear the commission's seal.

Article 81

1. As soon as the election results have been calculated, the chairman of the commission dispatches two copies each of the documents mentioned in Article 79 Paragraph 1 and Article 80 Paragraph 1 to the appropriate voivodship electoral commission.

2. The remaining documents of the electoral commission are sent by its chairman to the appropriate local body of the state administration. The provisions of Article 79 Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be applied here accordingly.

Chapter 13

Counting The Results Of Elections To Voivodship People's Councils And Announcing The Results Of Elections To People's Councils

Article 82

1. Immediately after receiving the returns of the voting for councillors of voivodship people's councils from polling district electoral commissions, the voivodship electoral commission shall examine these returns, correct any arithmetical errors and establish:

- 1) the results of the elections in individual constituencies,
- 2) the results of the elections from the voivodship list, and, on this basis, the results of the elections to the voivodship people's council.

2. The provisions of Article 77 Paragraph 2, Articles 78-80, and Article 81 Paragraph 2 shall be applied accordingly to the count of the election results referred to in Paragraph 1.

Article 83

1. Those candidates from the voivodship list who receive the largest number of valid votes, with at least half of those people eligible to vote in the given voivodship doing so, are regarded as elected.

Article 84

The voivodship electoral commission shall produce records on the election of councillors from the voivodship list. These shall specify:

- 1) the total numbers for the whole voivodship of:
 - a) people eligible to vote,
 - b) ballots cast,
 - c) invalid votes,
 - d) valid votes.
- 2) the names of councillors elected from the voivodship list.

The provisions of Article 77 Paragraph 2, Article 79 Paragraphs 3 and 4, and Article 81 Paragraph 2 shall be applied here accordingly.

Article 85

1. The voivodship electoral commission shall:

- 1) guarantee that the election results referred to in Article 82 are made public,
- 2) send the records concerning the elections to the voivodship people's council to the voivod for publication in the voivodship gazette.

2. Immediately after calculating the returns, the chairman of the commission shall send the State Electoral Commission one copy each of the returns concerning elections of councillors in constituencies and from the voivodship list and the records of elections to the voivodship people's council.

Article 86

1. The voivodship electoral commission shall:

1) examine the election records immediately after receiving them from local electoral commissions, correct any arithmetical errors and calculate the results of elections to local people's councils in the whole voivodship,

2) produce, in duplicate, an aggregate report on the results of elections to local people's councils in the voivodship,

3) guarantee that the results of the elections throughout the entire voivodship are made public,

4) send the records of elections to all people's councils in the voivodship to the voivod for publication in the voivodship gazette,

5) send one copy of the report referred to in item 2 to the State Electoral Commission, complete with one copy each of the voting returns for elections of councillors in constituencies and the records of elections to local people's councils.

2. The Council of State shall prepare a facsimile of the report referred to in Paragraph 1, Item 2.

3. The chairman of the commission shall send the remaining documents relating to the elections to the appropriate local body of the state administration. The provisions of Article 76 Paragraph 2 and 3 shall apply here accordingly.

Article 87

The voivodship electoral commission or the local electoral commission shall issue certificates of return to the candidates elected to people's councils.

Article 88

The State Electoral Commission shall announce the aggregate results of elections to people's councils throughout the country.

Chapter 14

Repeat Elections

Article 89

1. If less than 50 percent of those entitled to vote actually do so in elections in constituencies or from the voivodship list, repeat elections in constituencies or from the voivodship are called within 2 weeks of the date of the original elections.

2. The following bodies are authorized to call repeat elections:

- 1) in the case of voivodship people's councils--the Council of State, at the request of the State Electoral Commission,
- 2) in the case of local people's councils--the voivodship people's council presidium, at the request of the relevant voivodship electoral commission.

Article 90

1. Repeat elections are held in accordance with this law and on the basis of the electoral registers prepared for the original elections. The election calendar may provide for shorter deadlines.
2. Before repeat elections, the relevant selection committees may put forward:
 - 1) a new list of candidates for the constituency,
 - 2) a new voivodship list of candidates.
3. Repeat elections shall be held once only. Those candidates who receive highest number of valid votes are considered to be elected.

Chapter 15

Validity of Elections

Article 91

1. Should an electoral offense be committed or the provisions of this law be violated, with the offense or violation in question liable to have had a substantial influence on the election results, voters may lodge an objection, protesting against the election of a councillor, or questioning the validity of the elections. This must be done within 7 days of the election results being announced.
2. This objection should be lodged with the National Electoral Commission, which shall give the voter 7 days to submit documented charges. After this deadline has expired, the National Electoral Commission shall send the objection, together with the said charges, to the Supreme Court and also notify the Prosecutor General of the Polish People's Republic.
3. The cases referred to in Paragraph 1 shall be investigated by the Supreme Court, sitting in the presence of three judges in open session. The Supreme Court shall first hear testimony from the Prosecutor and the interested parties.

Article 92

1. Should the Supreme Court establish that the case involves violations of the provisions of this law or electoral offenses which were so significant as to have a [?dire] influence on the election results or the count of election returns, it shall invalidate, either wholly or in part, the elections in the constituency involved.

2. In invalidating elections, the Supreme Court shall at the same time indicate in its ruling from what point the process of arranging repeat elections should start and how this should be done.

Article 93

1. Within 14 days of elections being invalidated, the Council of State shall call repeat elections in the constituency concerned, taking into account the contents of the ruling referred to in Article 92, Paragraph 2.

2. The elections referred to in Paragraph 1 are conducted by the same electoral commissions on the basis of the same electoral registers, unless the offenses in question involve these commissions or these registers; in such cases, new commissions should be appointed or new registers drawn up immediately.

Article 94

If the objection concerns elections from a voivodship list, Articles 92 and 93 shall be applied accordingly.

Article 95

After repeat elections have been held in the given constituency, the relevant electoral commission shall calculate the election results.

Chapter 16

Expiration of the Councillors' Mandates, Supplementing and Changing the Composition of People's Councils

Article 96

1. A councillor's mandate expires if he/she:

- 1) dies,
- 2) relinquishes his/her mandate,
- 3) loses his/her right to be elected,
- 4) is recalled by his/her electors, or
- 5) is relieved of his/her mandate by the people's council concerned.

2. A councillor's mandate also expires if, having been elected from a voivodship list, the councillor is recalled by the respective voivodship people's council.

3. The expiration of a councillor's mandate, as defined in Paragraphs 1 and 2, shall be declared to have taken place by the respective people's council.

4. The respective people's council notifies the residents of the constituency which elected the councillor of the expiration of his/her mandate. The respective voivodship people's council notifies the resident of the voivodship of the expiration of the mandate of a councillor from the voivodship list.

Article 97

Electors may recall a councillor whose behavior is grossly incompatible with the dignity of a councillor, or who has betrayed the trust placed in him/her.

Article 98

1. A motion to ask electors to recall a councillor may be put forward by the appropriate council of the Patriotic Movement of National Revival or the organization defined in Article 40 which nominated him/her as a candidate.

2. The motion referred to in Paragraph 1 may also be put to a meeting of the appropriate urban or rural self-government body by electors from the constituency involved, provided this wins the support of at least one third of the electors.

3. The motion, substantiated in detail, shall be submitted to the people's council of which the councillor involved is a member through the offices of the council's presidium.

Article 99

1. The appropriate people's council presidium shall consider the motion referred to in Article 98 and report on it to the people's council. In considering such a motion, the presidium is obliged to allow the councillor to give an account of his/her conduct.

2. Having heard the presidium's report, the people's council may resolve to ask the electors to recall the councillor concerned; this resolution must achieve a two thirds majority with at least half of the total number of councillors present.

3. If a local people's council rejects the motion referred to in Article 98, the mover may appeal to the respective voivodship people's council; if the motion concerns a member of the voivodship people's council, the mover may appeal to the Council of State. Resolutions passed after the appeal has been considered are final.

Article 100

1. In implementing the resolution of a people's council to ask the electors to recall a councillor, the presidium of the people's council guarantees to organize a meeting or meetings in the constituency where the councillor was elected. Meetings of urban and rural self-government bodies shall be used to this end.

2. The electors shall be notified of the meetings referred to in Paragraph 1-- by posting bills or in some other manner normally accepted in the given region-- as will the councillor concerned.

3. Voting at these meetings shall be by show of hands, unless the meeting as a whole resolves to hold a secret ballot.

4. Minutes shall be kept of every meeting; these shall specify the number of electors present and the number of votes in favor of recalling the councillor.

Article 101

Basing its decision on the minutes of the meetings referred to in Article 100 Paragraph 1, the people's council shall declare the councillor's mandate to have expired if a majority of electors present at the meetings voted to recall him/her and the attendance at these meetings was not less than one third of all the electors.

Article 102

1. If a people's council rejects a motion to ask the electors to recall a councillor, the motion may not be reconsidered unless new circumstances justify the electors recalling their councillor.

2. Paragraph 1 also applies to those cases where the motion to recall a councillor is submitted to meetings of electors, but does not achieve the required majority.

3. If a councillor's term of office is due to end within 6 months, a motion to ask the electors to recall this councillor shall not be considered.

Article 103

1. A voivodship people's council may recall councillors elected from the voivodship list of candidates if their behavior is grossly incompatible with the dignity of a councillor or if they have betrayed the trust placed in them by their electors. The relevant voivodship council of the Patriotic Movement of National Revival or the organization defined in Article 40 which nominated the councillor as a candidate for the voivodship list may submit the motion to recall the councillor.

2. In the cases defined in Paragraph 1, the provisions of Article 99 Paragraphs 1 and 3 and of Article 102 Paragraphs 1 and 3 will be applied where relevant. The resolution to recall a councillor must achieve a two thirds majority in the respective voivodship people's council, with no less than half of the total number of councillors present.

Article 104

1. The people's council shall relieve a councillor of his mandate if:

1) he/she has refused to be sworn in as a councillor, or

2) he/she has been found guilty by a binding court verdict of an offense committed with a view to attaining material benefit or from other base motives, or

3) he/she has betrayed the oath he/she took on being sworn in.

2. Before a people's council adopts a resolution to relieve a councillor of his/her mandate for the reasons specified in Paragraph 1 Item 3, it should allow the councillor to give an account of his/her conduct. Article 102 shall apply here accordingly.

3. Councillors may appeal against the people's council's resolution relieving them of their mandates for the reasons specified in Paragraph 1 Item 3 to the relevant higher-level people's council within 2 weeks of receiving the resolution; if the resolution was passed by a voivodship people's council, they may appeal to the Council of State. Resolutions adopted after the appeal has been considered are final.

Article 105

1. At the session at which a people's council declares that a councillor's mandate has expired, it shall also adopt a resolution that the vacated seat be taken by the other candidate for the same seat from the same constituency, unless the other candidate has lost his/her right to be elected.

2. If it is impossible to fill the seat according to the procedure specified in Paragraph 1, the seat shall remain vacant.

3. At the session at which a voivodship people's council declares that the mandate of a councillor from the voivodship list has expired, it shall also adopt a resolution that the vacated seat be taken by the candidate from the same list who gained the next highest number of votes in the election and who has not lost his right to be elected. If the number of votes cast for two or more candidates was the same, the candidate whose name appeared first on the ballot shall fill the vacated seat.

Article 106

1. By-elections should be called if over half of the seats in a given constituency are vacant.

2. No by-elections shall be called if the people's councils' term of office is due to end within 6 months.

Article 107

1. By-elections shall be called by the presidium of the respective voivodship people's council; if the by-elections involve a voivodship people's council, they shall be called by the Council of State.

2. By-elections shall be held in accordance with the provisions of this law with the following reservations:

- 1) the resolution to call by-elections shall be published in the respective voivodship's gazette,
- 2) the by-election calendar may allow for shorter deadlines.

Article 108

1. Changes in administrative boundaries occurring during the term of office of people's councils produce the following changes in the composition of these councils:

- 1) if one administrative unit is divided into two or more units, or if part of an administrative unit is formed into a new unit, the councillors of the previous people's council become councillors in the new units according to their place of residence or the site of the constituency that elected them; lists of councillors for the new local people's councils are determined by the presidium of the voivodship people's council in calling the first session of these councils, the Council of State is empowered to act similarly; by-elections shall be held if the need arises,
- 2) if one administrative unit is incorporated into another unit, the councillors of the previous council become councillors of the new council for the enlarged unit,
- 3) if two or more administrative units merge into one new unit, the councillors of the previous councils become councillors of the council of the new administrative unit,
- 4) if an area comprising a constituency in elections to people's councils is separated from any administrative unit and incorporated into a neighboring one, the councillors elected from this constituency become councillors on the council of the enlarged unit,
- 5) if an area comprising a part of, or more than, one constituency in elections to people's councils is separated from an administrative unit and incorporated into a neighboring unit, councillors residing in this area become councillors of the council of the enlarged unit,
- 6) if any administrative unit is changed into a unit of some other kind, by-elections shall be held if necessary.

2. In changing the composition of people's councils in accordance with Paragraph 1, the principles contained in this law defining the number of councillors in people's councils may be abandoned.

Article 109

1. If a joint people's council is established for a town and gmina, the town and gmina councillors become councillors of one joint people's council.
2. If an urban district is established in a town not previously divided into districts, the district people's council is elected in accordance with the provisions of this law. The term of office of this people's council shall expire along with those of other local people's councils.

Chapter 17

Special and Concluding Regulations

Article 110

In the towns of Poznan and Wroclaw, electors elect both town and urban district people's councils.

Article 111

1. The cost of the elections will be covered from the state budget.
2. All correspondence and legal proceedings involved in the elections are exempt from all charges.
3. The preparation of polling stations for the electoral commissions referred to in Article 23 Paragraph 1, Items 2-4, and Article 23 Paragraph 2, and supplying these stations with the necessary equipment and implements, are the responsibility of the local bodies of the state administration operating in the areas where these stations are located, or of public enterprises appointed by those bodies.

Article 112

The presidia of people's councils enjoy the privileges and perform the duties specified in this law until the new people's councils elect new presidia.

Article 113

The law of 17 January 1976 on elections to the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic and people's councils (DZIENNIK USTAW No 2, Item 15) is hereby declared null and void as regards those parts referring to elections to people's councils.

Article 114

This law becomes effective on the day of its promulgation.

CSO: 2600/941

PRECONDITIONS FOR LAW AND ORDER EXAMINED

Warsaw LAD in Polish No 9, 4 Mar 84 p 1

[Article by Witold Olszewski: "Legality"]

[Text] It is not political, social and economic relations but legality which is the basic condition for stabilization in every government. The authority of the government and the citizens depends on legality, and hence their loyalty, activity and sensitivity to civic duty.

What actually is legality? It is a state of public affairs in which just law obligates to an equal degree the governing and the governed.

In the 17th and 18th centuries absolute monarchies spread in Europe, which means that the will of the ruler was not only deciding in the area of politics, but--which is more important--it constituted the unquestioned source of law. Quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem--as the legal profession at that time would say. This means that the will of the ruler had the power of law. Thus the ruler himself remained outside the law. In this "omnipotence," Christian rulers tried to be guided by natural law and ethical dictates. The temptations, however, were too great, and absolutism turned into despotism. This ended suddenly. Already at the end of the 18th century, revolution overthrew the thousand-year-old monarchy in France. In backward Russia, it was only in the 20th century that tsarist despotism collapsed under the blows of revolution. In constitutional, law-abiding Great Britain, the monarchy lasts until today, although there is no written constitution there and the political empire has crumbled.

In modern Europe there are no longer any monarchs standing outside the law. There are few at all. On the other hand, those governments that try to force their political will on society without regard for its sense of legality have multiplied. In this regard they therefore have become similar to the absolute monarchs that considered their will to be law.

It is not like that. A statute is the source of legal norms, but can also be the source of flagrant lawlessness. I will recall as a glaring example Hitler's so-called Nuremberg statutes, which were the basis for a policy of persecution, or the exterminatory statutes in the so-called Government-General during the occupation. Not that which calls itself law, but that which is in agreement with society's legal sense, is law. The ancient Romans propagated a maxim:

to live honestly, not to wrong another, and give to each his due. Here is another: law is the art of good and justice.

One should also not forget that besides statutes, law is embodied in ancient custom. Case-law plays, to be sure, an increasingly smaller role in the life of modern societies, since the tempo of this life and its sudden changes have evaded the norms of tradition. But after all, the aforementioned Great Britain continues not to have a written constitution and the jurisdiction of the British courts to a large degree depends upon the interpretation of old customs. What does this mean? It means that society itself can produce a law without the mediation of institutions created for this. English society is known for its high sense of legality, for its voluntary discipline in relation to the government and for its deep respect for the latter.

Up to now no one has thought of a better guarantee of legality in government than the institutional division of power into legislative, executive and judicial branches. They act independently of each other and in this way a balance is assured. The legislative branch, free from government pressure, makes statutes and controls the administration. Independent courts apply the law and administer justice impartially. Executive power, which by its nature is inclined to reach for increasingly new prerogatives, acts within legal bounds established neither by it nor for it.

What is the model of legality? Before it bend political powers which had achieved decisive positions in the government, for the correct functioning of the three divisions of power makes their role more complicated. On the other hand, a government with this structure is considerably more solid and resilient against periodic shake-ups and even cataclysms.

In this correct meaning legality is the foundation of government since government is not only a political but above all a legal creation.

In connection with this one should also mention a lesser but also important phenomenon, namely, the excessive proliferation of statutes. As everyone knows, in organized societies there functions a legal fiction that each citizen knows the laws that are in force. If it were otherwise, one could not demand compliance with the law. This legal fiction becomes more ethereal if there are too many statutes or if they change too quickly. For statutes must penetrate to the collective consciousness of society. Otherwise the authority of both the legislator and the legal norm diminishes. The principle of legality states that everything that is not forbidden is allowed, so the boundary between the allowed and the forbidden should be clear and unquestionable. There must also be a clear boundary between a law and an ordinary executive order. The dispossession, for instance, of farm property by a communal administration is an unjust abuse of authority that ought to be punished.

And the worst disservice is brought to the government by dead statutes that remain on paper and those dying in oblivion as if they were ordinary declarations.

The law must be respected by both those who make it and those who execute it, for it is--next to ethical norms--the most important regulator of collective life. The law operates through compulsion but impels obedience above all through a sense of legitimacy and justice.

CREDIBILITY IN TELEVISION PROGRAMMING STUDIED

Warsaw PRASA POLSKA in Polish No 2, Feb 84 pp 3-5

[Interview with Albin Kania, director of the Polish Radio and Television Public Opinion Research Center, by Henryk Maziejuk; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] The social and political crisis, it is obvious, also had its affect on the mass media. This was shown both in how the radio and television broadcasts were received and in how they were evaluated. What does the research show? How extensive was--and perhaps still is--the loss of confidence in Polish television and radio?

[Answer] The crisis in the relations between radio and television and the public clearly deepened after August 1980. This was shown in the poorer ratings as well as in the lower numbers of viewers and listeners. This process of crisis intensification lasted until 1982. In 1983 the downward trend in the television and radio audience, and particularly television, was checked.

[Question] Does this mean that confidence is no longer declining?

[Answer] If this process were to be charted, as is frequently done, the curve showing the ratings and the size of the audience no longer turns downwards but remains at the same level or even turns slightly upwards. Of course, the size and ratings indexes are still much lower than they were in the first half of 1980, but--as in the economy--a change has occurred and some kind of improvement is being seen.

[Question] I have observed that you show these trends not so much by charts as by tables, which give more detailed information than do charts.

[Answer] In presenting research results be use both tables and charts, and also verbal descriptions. We write what those questioned tell us...

[Question] In view of that, without going into details, what can be said about the popularity of particular programs? On the basis of this analysis can you tell us, describe, how large an audience does the Television News have at present, or had in the past--or the serial films, current-events features, or entertainment programs?

[Answer] The size of the Television News audience for the 7:30 pm broadcast in 1981 was 58 percent of the total adult population; in the first six months of 1982 it dropped to 53 percent, in the second six months to 50 percent, but in the first half of last year it again rose to 53 percent. These are, of course, averages for given periods, showing a trend which disregards seasonal or kind-of-day fluctuations. In fall and winter more people watch the news than in the spring and summer. Also, more people watch the news on weekdays than on the weekends.

The remaining two news broadcasts, which are shown at less convenient times, have a much smaller audience: the 5 pm news has about a 15 percent audience, and the 10 pm broadcast about 10 percent.

Aside from the television news, the fiction series, individual fiction films, and the Television Theater attract the most viewers. Programs of this type broadcast in prime time after the evening news attract from 40 to 80 percent of the viewers, i.e., 10 to 20 million, counting adults only.

[Question] As you said, these are averaged figures. There are, of course, large differences between particular programs, for not all films, features or entertainment programs are equally appealing or interesting. Please tell us, therefore, what are the ratings of the particular types of television programs. How well are they received by the audience?

[Answer] The most popular television programs in 1983 were:

--the Czech serial "The Hospital on the Outskirts", audience, over 70 percent; very good ratings, over 60 percent;

--the Polish serial "Close, Ever Closer", audience at particular segments, about 70 percent; very good ratings, 50-60 percent;

--the Czech serial "The Woman Behind the Counter", audience, over 60 percent; very good ratings, about 40 percent;

--the English serial "The Island of the Gulls", audience, about 70 percent; very good ratings, over 50 percent.

Of the Television Theater presentations: "Forefather's Eve", audience for part 1, 51 percent, for part 2, 52 percent; very good ratings, 26-29 percent. That is considerably more than the average index of very good ratings for theater presentations last year, which was 17 percent.

Of the educational programs: "The Probe", audience about 40 percent; very good ratings, also 40 percent; "With a Camera Among the Animals", audience over 30 percent; very good ratings, over 40 percent.

Of the current-events programs, the most popular programs are those which critically show matters relating to the difficulties worrying people, as for example, the "Always After 2200", or "The Market Stall".

Record audiences last year were noted for television broadcasts of certain events, such as the broadcast on the Pope's visit in Poland (audience 60-80 percent), deputy premier Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski's meeting with the Gdansk Shipyard workforce (80 percent audience).

[Question] I will now ask you about your research methods. How does the Public Opinion Research Center (OBOP) measure the audience and obtain the program ratings?

[Answer] Our studies provide answers to two questions:

1) How many people saw a certain television program or listened to a certain radio program,

2) How a certain program was rated by its viewers or listeners.

The size of the audience is given in relative numbers, i.e., in percentages of the total of the adult population in the country. This index can be converted to absolute numbers if we remember that 1 percent of the population over 15 years of age is about 280,000 people. As far as ratings are concerned, we use a scale similar to that which everyone knows from his schooldays: 5 -- a very good program; 4 -- good, 3 -- average, 2 -- poor, 1 -- bad.

[Question] How many programs are rated?

[Answer] Almost all of the television programs and several dozen daily radio programs, or a total of about 10,000 programs during the course of a year.

[Question] Who does the rating? How many respondents are there?

[Answer] About 1,000 persons do the rating. They are chosen at random in 200 regions of the country. These are people of various professions and ages, living in cities and in the countryside. They keep a daily diary of their television viewing and radio listening. If they see or hear a program, they give it a rating. The surveys are made very week and because there are four samples surveyed alternately and every one of them is subject to constant rotation, the entire composition of the respondents changes entirely every so often.

[Question] So that there should be no professional respondents? Are they rewarded in any way?

[Answer] The only gratuity that the respondents receive is an exemption from radio-television fees during the time that they participate in the survey. These fees, so far, amount to 40 zlotys per month. And so this gratuity is rather symbolic in nature.

[Question] What happens with the survey results?

[Answer] Using them as a basis, the OBOP prepares reports which are issued weekly. We know from these reports how large a percentage of people watched a certain program and whether this index is higher or lower than the average index for the last 12 months. We also know, taking the audience at 100 percent,

what percentage of the people gave the program a very good rating and whether this index is higher or lower than average. In addition, we conduct in-depth studies on how selected programs, such as the Daily Television News or a musical radio program, are received. These surveys give us more detailed opinions and evaluations. The materials collected in this manner make it possible for us to make various deductions. They are helpful, most of all, to the television management which constructs the repertoire and the people who create the program. Those who do this must know the tastes, needs, habits and viewpoints of their customers.

[Question] Do we know which television program drew the largest audience?

[Answer] The broadcast of the pontifical mass in 1978, when Karol Wojtyla became Pope, was viewed by 92 percent of the adult population. This is, so far, a record.

[Question] How large is the listening audience for the church mass broadcast on the radio on Sundays?

[Answer] The first mass, broadcast on 21 September 1980, was heard by 50 percent of those surveyed. The next, and successive masses in 1980 and 1981, were heard by about 30 percent. In 1982 this index fluctuated around 20 percent, and last year it was 16 percent.

[Question] Let us return to the main broadcast of the Daily Television News, which comprises, essentially, a program of news, journalism briefs and commentaries. It has, as you said, a very large audience and is a sensitive instrument of the overall influence of propaganda...

[Answer] ...which is really very difficult to imagine. Please note that 13-15 million people watch the Daily Television News. This is more than the readership of the entire press. That is how many people look at the same program at the same time, evaluate its content, and compare it with their own knowledge and experience.

[Question] Well then, how is the Daily Television News rated in the surveys?

[Answer] There are large fluctuations here. A great deal depends on the mood of the public. In 1980, the News received 35 percent very good ratings, which then dropped to 24 percent. The lowest ratings came during the period of martial law, when this index fell all the way down to 14 percent. It is now 16 percent. These ratings are no longer falling.

[Question] Based on your surveys, how much confidence is there in what television, or, to put it otherwise, television propaganda, broadcasts?

[Answer] We ask whether people believe what is said to them or shown on television, especially on matters dealing with the country and society. And here attitudes vary greatly. The surveyed group is divided more or less in half, and some periods were better than others. Concretely: in 1982 less than 40 percent of the television viewers said that they definitely or reasonably believe what is said and shown to them on television. The question was repeated

several times in 1983 and it was shown that positive replies fluctuate around 45 percent. This is a slight increase in confidence, therefore, but it still does not encompass the majority.

[Question] How does this compare with the preceding period?

[Answer] Prior to August 1980 two-thirds of the television viewers declared their confidence in television.

[Question] Somehow this does not fit with what is being said about the propaganda success of that period. Could it be that people believed in something that did not deserve their trust?

[Answer] A relationship towards television depends not only what it presents, but also on the political stance and the material living conditions of the people who watch it. Those who feel that their living conditions are good or average much more frequently say that they believe in what is said and shown to them on television than do those who feel that their living conditions are poor. And far more people found themselves in this situation in 1980 than previously, because although signs of crisis already appeared they were not felt as much by the people.

[Question] The government is experiencing a crisis of confidence and this also infiltrated state television and radio. This, too, is an important factor.

[Answer] Without a doubt. Anyway, there are many more such factors. For example, the wilful disavowal of propaganda and television by the opponents also played a part. It was they who announced loudly and everywhere that the "television lies", wishing to undermine the confidence of the viewers. This campaign reached an audience that was susceptible to influence, that is why it was able to somewhat weaken the confidence in television, or in what it shows, thus intensifying a process which even without this was already gaining momentum.

[Question] There also were calls for a boycott. Was it possible to see the effects of such appeals?

[Answer] We did not see this in our surveys, although we made some special analyses on this subject. This was simply not observable in our statistical samplings. Even if some people turned off their television sets, let us say 50,000 or 100,000 Polish television viewers, this was not observable because this was a very small amount in relation to the total.

[Question] How large an audience, in percent, does our television have?

[Answer] Its daily audience now is 80 percent of the adult society, and in 1978 it was 88 percent. That is how many people turn on the television set daily. Of course, what they watch and how long, whether they watch one or two or more programs, is also important. We find that mostly they watch more than one program. There are many who limit themselves to the evening news and the program that immediately follows--a play, film, or some other program.

[Question] Polish Television stopped broadcasting the second program [second channel]. It may be conjectured that this, too, helped to decrease the television audience.

[Answer] In a very small degree. Some people do not receive the second program at all, since it is not available to them or they are not in the habit of watching it. Television broadcasting is mainly through the first program. Most of the second channel programs reach a 1-2 percent audience. About 20-30 percent of the public get only very good films on this channel, and that rarely. Based on an analysis made in 1982, but in other years also the situation was the same, it can be said that the average daily viewing of the first program (channel 1) by one adult Pole totaled 160 minutes, while the daily viewing of the second channel amounted to scarcely 8 minutes.

[Question] Televisions programs are the creation of very many people of various specialties. But in the case of news and current events, the input of journalists is particularly important and that is why, I think, a rating of these programs can be assumed to be a rating of their work.

[Answer] Probably. But we must remember that television's success, as the people see it, lies in its function as entertainment, and only then as information and education. Thus television is rated mainly according to how it satisfies the need for entertainment. Based on our research I can say that most of our television viewers continue to be dissatisfied with the repertoire of our television. There are two points which are repeated most often. First, that there are too few fiction films and entertainment programs, and second, that there is too much talk, publicity and propaganda. And although the number of unfavorable opinions expressed is now less than a year ago, nevertheless this is still the opinion of the majority of television viewers.

[Question] Does this mean that the current-events programs should be made more attractive?

[Answer] Certainly we should strive to make them better, more attractive from the television standpoint. But the television viewers expect something more from current-events coverage than simply attractive forms of coverage. Rather they would like to see an honest comparison of what they hear and see on television with what they see everyday in their own surroundings. They want to see themselves in television, their problems, the difficulties that they have to contend with, their own future prospects. It is here that the divergencies appear, the formulation of charges that television is engaged in propaganda, and the viewers ascribe a pejorative meaning to the word "propaganda".

[Question] True. How, then, do we reconcile the fact that these same viewers, at least in part, are influenced by the most distinctly propagandist, tendentious, Polish-language radio programs broadcast to Poland from Western radio stations?

[Answer] It may be said that there are two reasons for listening to foreign broadcasts. One is the desire to obtain additional information, and the second

is the desire for confirmation of certain of their own convictions, which--if they are negative in regard to our system--will be found there.

[Question] There is no doubt that these radio stations have a destructive influence. Can the range of their influence be diminished?

[Answer] Certainly it can, although I doubt that these influences can be eliminated entirely. But I do believe that the best way to reduce the audience for these foreign radio stations is to constantly improve our programs and the flow of information from our mass media. But I will also stress that the need to improve and develop them stems primarily from their service role to our society.

[Interviewer] Thank you for the interview.

9295

CSO: 2600/885

BRIEFS

NEW PERSONAL COMPUTER--A new computer designed in Poland, the so-called "Com-Pan" professional personal computer, was put on display on 18 April in Warsaw during a plenary meeting of the Polish Academy of Sciences Section Four--Technical Sciences. This high-quality machine was designed by a team of specialists at the Comprehension Automation Systems Research Center of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Fliwice. The "Com-Pan" computer is designed to serve as an aid for engineering jobs in industry and support management and administrative functions, and it can also be put to work in medical diagnostics and scientific research work automation. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 19 Apr 84 p 5]

SUPPORT FOR TEXTILE INDUSTRY--On 19 April the Presidium of the Planning Commission under the Council of Ministers--with representatives of the Ministry of Metallurgy and the Machine Building Industry, the Ministry of Finance, the National Bank of Poland, and the management of the "Polmatex" Association of Textile Machinery Manufacturing Enterprises in attendance--reviewed a program for the growth and the stepped up production of textile machinery and equipment over the period 1984-1990. The growth of this branch of the machine building industry is a prerequisite to the implementation of Resolution No 7 of the Government Presidium dated 1 February 1983. The main objective of this resolution was to lay the groundwork for increased output in light industries. According to the main provisions of this program drafted by the Ministry of Metallurgy and the Machine Building Industry, it is projected that by 1990 deliveries of domestically manufactured machinery will meet 70 percent of the requirements of light industries, while at the same time demand for basic types of machinery will be 100 percent covered. It is expected that by 1990 output of textile machinery will be 1.7 times greater than it is today, but actual deliveries of this machinery for use by the Polish light industries will be three times greater than they were in 1983. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 20 Apr 84 p 2]

POWER STATION PROJECT RESUMED--On 19 March the Government Presidium made a decision to resume work on the construction of the pumped-storage power plant at Mloty near Bystrzyca Kłodzka (Walbrzych Province). Work on this project began in 1979. However, 2 years later, due to the country's difficult economic situation, this project was placed on hold. On 10 April Gen Div Czesław Piotrkowski, minister of the mining and power industries, and a group of specialists who accompanied him were briefed on the status of the project and local conditions affecting the construction of the "Mloty" pumped-storage power

plant. The construction of the "Mloty" pumped-storage power plant will take 10 years, and its ultimate power rating will amount to 750 MW of generating capacity (three power generating units with an output of 250 MW each). Thus, this will turn out to be Poland's largest pumped-storage power plant. At the present time, the combined generating capacity of all power plants of this type in Poland comes to 1,370 MW. The biggest one is at Zarnowiec, and it has a power rating of 680 MW. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 11 Apr 84 p 5]

UNION COMPLAINTS ABOUT ECONOMY--The Council of Ministers has been receiving numerous letters, statements and resolutions from factory-level trade union organizations and their nationwide federations concerning current economic policies. These statements contain critical comments about pricing trends and expressions of concern over rising living costs in the wake of the recent producer good price increases. It is against this background that especially frequent references were made to the problem of the socially equitable sharing of the costs associated with efforts to surmount the ongoing crisis. The government is proceeding with all due seriousness in analyzing both these statements and also the comments which are being made during meetings with trade union representatives from different occupational groups and regions. In view of the large number of letters being sent and the wide range of conclusions drawn in these letters it is not possible to send out individual replies to all the authors. At some point in the next few days the Council of Ministers Committee for Trade Union Affairs will issue a public statement in response to the comments, opinions and conclusions contained in this correspondence. The Government Press Spokesman [signed]. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 19 Apr 84 p 2]

KUBIAK AT EXHIBIT OPENING--On 19 April 1984 Hieronim Kubiak, member of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee, attended the opening of an exhibit at the Lenin Museum in Krakow titled "Vladimir Lenin in the Eyes of Folk and Non-professional Artists." [Text] [Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 20 Apr 84 p 2]

KUBIAK AT KRAKOW PARTY MEETING--A "Report on the Status and Activities of the Party in Selected Professions and Social Organizations" was presented at a plenary meeting of the Krakow PZPR Committee held on 19 April 1984. Hieronim Kubiak, member of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee, attended the plenum. [Text] [Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 20 Apr 84 p 2]

CSO: 2600/923

BRIEFS

GOVERNMENTAL PERSONNEL CHANGES--The president of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Stefan Mocuta is relieved of his position as chairman of the Committee for Peoples Councils Problems, Comrade Teodor Coman is appointed chairman of the Committee for Peoples Councils Problems and Comrade Marin Dragnea is relieved of his position as deputy minister of tourism and sports. [Excerpts] [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 31, 11 Apr 84 p 2]

CSO: 2700/187

SALARIES OF TOP GOVERNMENT, PARTY POSTS

Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 27 Mar 84 p 2

[Text] The coefficient currently used for the highest positions is 4.8. For several years the basis has been set at a lower figure than the average anticipated by the law. Soon a new agreement on common bases and measures for determining personal income of officials will be reached.

The Yugoslav Assembly will soon begin the procedure for drafting a new agreement on common bases and measures for determining personal income of officials. That agreement will bring a number of innovations, among which the most essential is that the material position of officials will be brought much more than previously into harmony with their work results and the total socioeconomic results of the sociopolitical community in which they work. In the meantime, the public sees from time to time partial data on current income of officials that only partly covers all the questions related to the comprehensive earnings picture for officials.

Present Manner of Calculation

On this occasion, the editor of TANJUG turned to the Coordinating Commission for Monitoring Implementation of the Existing Social Agreement on Personal Income and Other Benefits of Federal Officials. This social agreement was signed by the Yugoslav Presidium, the Yugoslav Assembly, the Federal Executive Council, the LCY Central Committee, the SAWPY Federal Conference, the Trade Union League Council, The League of Associated Fighters of the National Liberation War of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Economic Chamber. According to reports from the Coordination Commission, the monthly personal income of federal officials is determined by multiplying the average monthly income of a person employed in the Yugoslav economy by a coefficient established separately for each post. The previous year's earnings are taken as the basis. The figure arrived at is increased by an appropriate percent of personal income based on previous work. At present, the coefficient used for the highest post is 4.8.

It should be noted that for a number of years, that basis has been set at a lower amount than provided for by law. In the past 3 years, it lagged by

about 30 percent. The current basis is 11,136, while last year the average monthly income in economic positions was 15,638 dinars.

On the basis of this sort of calculations, the president and members of the Yugoslav Presidium, the president and members of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, the president of the Federal Executive Council [FEC] and the SAWPY Federal Conference president receive salaries established by multiplying the basis of 11,136 dinars by the coefficient of 4.8, to which is added a percentage based on previous work experience. Thus officials in these posts who have a maximum of 17.5 percent based on previous experience have a total monthly income of 62,807 dinars.

The president of the Presidium of the Yugoslav Trade Union Council receives 57,061 dinars, including his previous experience add-on, while the Yugoslav Economic Chamber president receives 52,149 dinars. The president of the Presidium of the Federal Organization of the League of Associated Fighters of the National Liberation War of Yugoslavia, who is retired, receives in addition to his pension 10,341 dinars monthly as the difference between his salary and the pension amount.

With experience add-ons, the salaries of members of the Presidium of the SAWPY Federal Conference range from 48,553 to 50,557, that of members of the Presidium of the Yugoslav League of Trade Unions Council from 43,263 to 51,030, that of members of the Presidium of the Yugoslav Economic Chamber from 48,876 to 49,722, and that of members of the veterans' organization Presidium is set at 49,724 dinars. After their terms are completed, the presidents of the presidiums of these four organizations receive the same salaries as members of their respective organization.

If someone's salary when he assumes a position is higher than that set by the Social Agreement for the position he enters, that salary is not increased until it equals the set figure.

"Function Add-On"

Officials and delegates in the Yugoslav Assembly receive salaries in accordance with the Law on Supplements to Personal Income and Other Benefits for Delegates of the Yugoslav Assembly and Officials Elected or Selected by the Yugoslav Assembly. An official of the Yugoslav Assembly receives a salary equal to that received prior to election as a delegate, i.e., he has his previous salary. When delegates are elected for a period of 1 year, they receive a special supplement for filling a given position: currently the president of the Yugoslav Assembly receives 9,856 dinars, the vice president of the Yugoslav Assembly and the president of the Council receive 7,392, and the vice president of the Council and presidents of its task forces receive 6,160 dinars. When they cease to fill such positions, that is, after 1 year, the supplement is canceled.

Thus, with the previous experience add-on, the salary of the current president of the Yugoslav Assembly is 55,822, of the assembly vice president, 62,360, of the president of the Federal Council, 48,388, of the president

of the Council of Republics and Provinces, 54,364, of the vice president of the Federal Council, 50,532, of the vice president of the Council of Republics and Provinces, 55,704, and of presidents of committees and other task forces, from 46,900 to 62,807 dinars. Given the varying salaries they received when they came to the Yugoslav Assembly and the variations in prior experience, the total salaries of officials of the Yugoslav Assembly vary quite a bit, but according to the law, they cannot exceed the salary set for the highest federal post, which is 62,807.

Delegates in the Yugoslav Assembly also receive a set 3,500 dinar supplement for carrying out their delegate functions in the territory of their election, and in that case, do not have a right to per diem payments. This set payment is not calculated as part of their salary. Other federal officials do not receive this type of compensation.

All other types of income, such as per diem payments, separate maintenance allowances, moving expenses, etc., are paid to officials in the same manner as they are paid in associated labor or in other occupations.

12131

CSO: 2800/261

BOSNIAN PAPER CRITICIZES SLOVENE STUDENT JOURNAL'S SATIRE

Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 30 Mar 84 p 3

[Article by Zoran Odic: "How TRIBUNA Has Laid Yugoslavia To Rest"]

[Text] The fact that TRIBUNA published an obituary for Yugoslavia is the finishing touch to remarks of this and other newspapers which dispute Marxism, brotherhood and unity under the guise of democracy.

The most recent issue of the Ljubljana student newspaper TRIBUNA published an obituary for Yugoslavia on the first and last pages of its large-page format. On the first page, framed in black, it tells of the "sad news" that death took place "primarily because of the demands placed upon it in accordance with the faithful implementation of the Long-Range Program of Economic Stabilization, and not because of the conditions we accepted in attempting to come to an agreement with the International Monetary Fund..." etc., and on the last page there is a map of Yugoslavia with a black silhouette, and words, enclosed in a black frame, which offer gratitude "to all the good people who have known her," and which say, "we leave her with fond memories, " signed, "all of her citizens."

The Role of Pallbearer

This is the way the students of the Edvard Kardelj University in Ljubljana used their newspaper to comment upon the news of the successful completion of negotiations of the Yugoslav government--that is, the government of the just deceased Yugoslavia--with representatives of the International Monetary Fund and these negotiations, as well as the conditions accepted, are in line with the implementation of the Long-Range Program of Economic Stabilization--at least according to all official statements--and in some details are more lenient than what is set down in the Long-Range Program.

The conclusion: Our own government, composed of representatives of all Yugoslav republics and provinces, have interred their own country in whose name they act, and not one of the over 22 million citizens of Yugoslavia had the courage to oppose it except for a student newspaper at a Ljubljana University, and it did so only in the role of pallbearer.

It seems that the students of the Ljubljana University--one cannot really say all of the students here, but certainly those who write in the name of the student body--have had it in for Yugoslavia over the last several years, as if the country had somehow wronged them, disturbed them in some way. Attesting to this is last year's decision not to participate in the sports competition for Yugoslav youths, the decision of this year not to participate in the closing ceremony at Youth Day, and the refusal to withdraw that decision in spite of a position adopted to correct the closing ceremonial plan in accordance with the criticism expressed, and finally, the constant expression of their positions being more "progressive" than others.

Of course, any criticism expressed against them is indicative of the ruling status quo, just as any opposition to the "regime" is indicative of democracy, in their opinion. This kind of exclusivism can be understood, but not accepted. It makes one wonder all the more that "democratic" statements like those appearing in NOVA REVIJA from one issue to the next which consistently dispute self-management, Marxism, and Leninism, statements like those in public forums and discussions on controversial tracts such as "Partisan Pluralism or Monism," CAVOSKI, and KOSTUNICA, the most recent artistic and political stroke of TRIBUNA, and the next one which is anticipated with great interest, and the theatrical production "Politics as Destiny" in performance at Belgrade's Student Cultural Center, are all silently permitted, or at least not publicly criticized, while problems arise over the marginal quarrels of a few feuding journalists in a few Ljubljana editorial offices.

Against Everyone Except For Themselves

At the same time as this was taking place, the Board of Judges of the Ljubljana Basic Court freed two people--now adults, two years ago they were older juveniles--of any responsibility for fascist provocations in public, for public attacks in a restaurant against "Bosnians, Albanians," who should "go back where they came from," and for using fascists salutes and saying "Heil, Hitler," because they were only teasing, so it was noted, in claiming that "Slovenia will soon become Bosnia," and that Bosnia is a synonym for primitivism, dirt, and everything inferior. None of this was a "culpable act" for the court, and the escalation of this kind of behavior continues; all that is now happening attests to this. Of course, there are other examples, such as what was written in the last three issues of the weekly TELEKS. An extraordinary amount of investigative effort was put into an explanation of conditions in which those "guest workers from the south" live, but few paid any attention to this.

Neither democracy, nor the readiness to invest even a little effort in solving problems, is demonstrated in this way. These kinds of relationships only exacerbate the problems. The problems are exacerbated the most if they--regardless of what they are called, whether TRIBUNA, NOVA REVIJA, or something else--distance themselves from Yugoslavia, if they consider Yugoslavia to be something outside of themselves because they blame it for everything. It is as if they do not understand that in this way they place themselves not only outside of Yugoslavia, but outside of Slovenia--and we make a point of emphasizing this--because they behave as if Slovenia is at one pole and Yugoslavia, or the other republics and provinces, is at the other. Perhaps this makes it more apparent why they are against self-management, against association of labor and resources (everything goes to the south), against everything except for themselves.

YOUTH PAPER'S EDITORIALIST MOCKS SERBIAN CHAUVINISM

Belgrade OMLADINSKE in Serbo-Croatian 11 Mar 84 p 3

[Commentary by Dragan Bisenic: "Singing Modes of History"]

[Text] In Serbia, apparently, only the Kopaonik area [frequent site of earthquakes] shakes more than the national space in the heads of Serbs and Sorabs [reference to historical inferences in the writings of the painter Milic from Macva], so every 3 years--on the average--the possible manifestations of danger from Serbs and for Serbs are analyzed and collected. The "defenders of Serbdom" have emerged in public via leaflets in Vranje, Nis, Kragujevac, Leskovac, and Krusevac, calling for the "defense of the Nation," thus directly influencing the conclusions drawn by various political gatherings to the effect that "nationalism is on the rise."

Naturally, the dream of all militant Serbian nationalism consists of beans seasoned with Croatian lard and Albanian cutlets, stirred with the ladle of a skilled master so that this jumble would become equally enticing to fancy restaurants and factory dining halls; nor can a stomach accustomed to such food remain indifferent to other sweetmeats, delicately sugared. For the moment, no one is shouting "jump, jump, hit a Croat in the eye" [rhyming original] in Serbian streets, yet Serbian mythology and tradition (termed national romanticism in Kosovo Province) are being renewed in the service of the interpretation of reality. Also in circulation are demands from those with a unitarian orientation for a place of honor for Serbs, the donor's place, in Olympic Yugoslavia on the grounds that Serbs are the "nation-creating and historic nation," the protector of the country's integrity; accusations describing Serbian political leaders as opportunistic and unenergetic in advocating Serbian interests; the idea that Kosovo took away everything from Serbia; and the like. The starting point for all of this is the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo, transformed into ethnic revanchism; for the political leaders of Kosovo, Serbia, and Yugoslavia, into a test of capability and confidence. And let the unsuccessful nationwide competition for specialists for Feroniki Factory in Glogovac [in Kosovo Province] serve as an example of the nonexistence of confidence. Neither housing units nor huge paychecks could neutralize the prejudice that nationalists in Kosovo are destroying everybody one after the other. Nor could statements about the "stabilization of the situation in the province," resembling a modest wish more than a sustainable appraisal, convince anyone otherwise.

The public neither forgets nor forgives errors in politics and controversial interpretations. Not much effort is needed to recall the contrary appraisals of 7 years ago concerning Kosovo and certain official and detailed viewpoints, as when a session of the central committee's presidium of Serbia's League of Communists stated 26 December 1977 that "Serbian nationalists are misusing migration trends among Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo." Four years later, "Migration" [cognate with English word in original] had become transformed into "out-migration," "exodus," "genocide."

A thoroughgoing public clash with old ways of doing things is essential to proletarian revolutions, which "ridicule cruelly and fundamentally halfway measures, weaknesses, and cowardliness of their first attempts" (Marx in "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte").

Serbs very often renew the ABC's of their history in singing modes in locations where the occasion for gathering consists of competition and the opportunity to win, to overcome an opponent, all of this cloaked in sectarian veils on account of the fact that "We are who we are and we will show them." Radoslav Ratkovic states in an interview in NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE: "I cannot understand why anyone would be bothered if someone starts singing a song about the great, fantastic hero Stevan Sindjelic [of the First Serbian Rising in 1804]. If anybody is bothered, that is his problem, because the person who sings about Stevan Sindjelic and everybody else ought to be proud of the fact that he is singing about the Serbian revolution, the most progressive event in this part of Europe and the world at the time. People died for that cause. Do not prevent me from singing this or else I will begin to doubt my own national freedom." The message, of course, is supposed to be to avoid haste in evaluating the ideological aspects of a song. However, can anyone imagine--for example--the delegates from Slovenia, Croatia, or Macedonia being proud because the Serbian delegates exiting from the snack bar in the Yugoslav Assembly to a session are singing about their "fantastic Serbian hero"? Probably not, because the assembly is not a choral society. Certainly Skoplje MZT basketball players were not overhappy when 2,500 fans in the Kraljevo gymnasium expressed their joy over a victory by the local Sloga team by singing "Heroes Were Dancing in the Heart of the Land of Serbia," nor would any other team from "outside Serbia" on account of Serbs' similar and frequent evocations of their proud past. Belgrade was consternated when the irredentist slogan "eho eho" was chanted at the Zvezda soccer stadium, yet now it is presumably normal for guests to be shown how heroes dance around here and how no one can do anything to these heroes in their land of illustrious forefathers and traditions. Circumstances filled with a search for the national element determine the rhythm of the songs in this instance.

The theater, because of its incompetence or lack of courage to dissect the complexities of the present day, has put its boards to use in the booming search for a Serbia that exists nowhere. Almost every theater in Belgrade has its own Serbian performance: Studio 212 has "The Collapse of the Serbian Empire," the Yugoslav Dramatic Theater "The Battle of Kolumbara" [contemporary dramatization of segment of novel by Dobrica Cosic about World War I], the National Theater "The Salonians Speak" [reminiscences of Serbian veterans of the Salonica front in World War I], not to speak of such performances as "They

Have Killed the Prince" [contemporary work by Zika Lazic about 19th-century Prince Milan], "The Wanderings of the Serbs" [adaptation of 19th-century work by Djura Jaksic], and "The Sentandreja Rhapsody" [nostalgic work about the Serbian community of 19th-century Budapest]. In Kosovo Province, they call this national romanticism; here, it is theater. On the other hand, can anyone imagine the reaction if so many performances involving lectures in the national history of the Albanians (or Shiptars) were being shown in Pristina. No one says that these performances contain the generator for the light bulb of Serbian nationalism, but traditionalism is certainly somewhere in that direction.

Traditionalism also rocks mythology in its lap, usually for a dual purpose: as an integrative and mobilizing factor in the face of external danger to the nation, or as proof that the nation will reward every sacrifice offered in its name. In the first instance, it is clear who the external danger is (there is no evidence for the moment that the danger is illusory). For the second purpose, Saint Sava can serve as personified in the minds of the Serbian plebs as a hermit, constantly on a diet, a person who gave himself over to asceticism, denying himself riches and glory to be a recluse on Mount Athos. This Saint Sava differs from the Saint Sava described by Bishop Homatijan of Salonica, who praises him as long as he was on Mount Athos but rebukes him for reportedly associating with actresses instead of clergy, giving parties, riding luxurious horses, and carousing. This Rastko Nemanjic [original name of Saint Sava] as the creator of Serbian independent statehood, skillful politician and diplomat, reconciler of his brothers Stevan and Vukan, and a person with a sense for building into Serbian culture what had originated in the spirit of the people--this Rastko Nemanjic does not seem to be recognized by his "saintly" interpreters and apologists for the mythical Sava, who--embodied in the "Saint Sava spirit" through no fault of his own--was eventually the patron for Chetnik slaughters and massacres. This "profane" Sava does not suit the Serbian Orthodox Church in the role which it has envisaged for itself, i.e., the preservation of the Serbian nation.

Svetozar Markovic has written a message for later readers: "I assert that arbitrary officials, policemen, the stocks, the beatings, the nightsticks, the maces, and all the horrible tyranny are also in the 'spirit of the people'.... Only that should be thrown out, even if it is Serbian a hundred times.... In Serbian, there is no particular need to resurrect the dead or put rotten lumber in the foundations of a new structure. Other ideas should be used to revive the Serbian people, some other model should be provided for the future and another foundation. Let the Christian virtues of our forefathers rest in peace. We need different, humane virtues...." Forgetting the past is an abuse of the present, but abusing of the past is a crime against the present and the mutilation of the future.

Accordingly, let Serbia collapse. Presumably then we will be people and that alone.